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Employee share ownership is a system employed by companies wherein at least one 
employee acquires equity shares, giving them shareholding status with their employing 
company and earning pay through those shares. The Ravintolakolmio group is a res-
taurant group that owns and runs 13 and co-operates 4 franchised restaurants in the 
Greater Helsinki area, founded in 1979 by Heimo Keskinen, who still to this day owns 
the majority of the group. This thesis was written between April and November 2013.  
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine how employee share ownership works and what 
effects it has in the Ravintolakolmio group, as perceived by those in the program. 
Mainly, the perceived benefits and drawbacks are presented. This was researched 
through three main qualitative interviews, averaging 1 hour 10 minutes in length, and 
one supporting interview. 
 
The results show that employee share ownership offers many benefits for both em-
ployee and employer, such as increased job satisfaction and commitment. It offers em-
ployees a tax-efficient way to earn based on their performance, while simultaneously 
improving their performance and level of motivation. Drawbacks include the nominal-
isation of one’s power and the possibility of losing one’s investment. 
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1 Introduction 
Committed, motivated, and hardworking employees are the cornerstone of any suc-
cessful business, and in no field is this truer than in the service industry, as employees 
create and deliver the product to customers. Especially in the restaurant industry, 
where wages are low and staff turnover is high, it can be difficult for companies to mo-
tivate their employees. Yet, commitment and enthusiasm of employees has long been 
connected to improved results (Knyght, Kouzmin, Kakabadse & Kakabadse 2010, 
1314). Even service industry companies though have the opportunity to turn employ-
ees from a mere exploitable resource into a strategic advantage. 
 
The Ravintolakolmio group, an operating restaurant group in Helsinki, was chosen as 
the commissioning company for this thesis due to their unique approach to this issue. 
The Ravintolakolmio group rewards and motivates managers, for example restaurant 
managers, within the group with a system called employee share ownership. This 
means that they offer key employees partner-ownership of the company they work in. 
The employee invests in the company and receives shares, which will create dividends 
for them. The company hopes to gain commitment, and thus increased revenue and 
profitability, through this system. 
 
In a people-oriented field as the service industry, human resource management is espe-
cially important. I was intrigued by this topic due to the strategic point of view of hu-
man resource management, where the aim is not merely to manage the workforce, but 
to turn it into a competitive advantage. This topic also combined some of my other 
interests, such as accounting and business law, which I wanted to learn more about, as 
neither topic is gone into in depth during our studies at Haaga. I felt that this topic was 
a great way to learn more about significant strategic decisions in companies, as I pre-
pared for my next challenge after graduation, as the CEO of an SME.  
 
The aim of my thesis is to examine how the employee share ownership program is per-
ceived by those involved in it. My thesis investigates how it is beneficial, from the 
point of view of both the employee and the company. It is analysed through interviews 
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of key persons, supported by financial and human resource data. My thesis will essen-
tially explore the question, how having a mid-level manager own x% of a company has 
an effect, especially in terms of increased performance and lower employee turnover 
for the company; and increased work commitment, motivation, and satisfaction, and 
gained monetary rewards, and all tax benefits therein, for the employee. The full list of 
benefits and drawbacks of employee share ownership is presented in the theory. My 
own personal goal is to learn more about strategic human resource management in the 
restaurant industry. 
 
The research topic of this thesis was contemplated in the spring of 2013, and a re-
search plan was drawn up and the commission by the company received in April 2013, 
as shown in Attachment 1, the project timetable. The research of the topic and prelim-
inary drafts were written throughout the summer of 2013. The main interviews were 
conducted in September-October and the thesis was completed in November. 
 
1.1 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised according to the “zipper” model, meaning that the content is 
organised by topic instead of the traditional order of theory, methods, results and dis-
cussion. Each chapter contains the theoretical framework, current practical applica-
tions and research results of that topic. I chose this model due to its suitability to this 
topic and the qualitative research therein. 
 
Firstly, the commissioning company is introduced, and the research questions, hypoth-
esis and scope are determined as well. Then the research methods are presented, and 
the final part of the introduction chapter is the definition of the dissertation’s key con-
cepts. 
 
Chapters two through four are the research part of the thesis. The order of the topics 
is organised on the basis of cause (chapter 2) and effect (chapters 3-4) (Hirsjärvi, 
Remes & Sajavaara 2007, 40). Their topics are, in order, the fundamentals of employee 
share ownership, the extrinsic effects of employee share ownership, and the intrinsic 
effects of employee share ownership. Each topic is further then divided into subsec-
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tions. Each issue in the subsections is generally addressed in the same approach, start-
ing with the theoretical framework, followed by the current utilisation and applications 
within the Ravintolakolmio group, and finally the results of the research and the per-
ceptions of the interviewees are presented. 
 
The last chapter is a discussion of the whole issue, where general conclusions from the 
research results are drawn, and the implications of these conclusions to the Ravin-
tolakolmio group are presented. The timetable and process of this thesis are contem-
plated and evaluated. Finally, the limitations of this study are examined and recom-
mendations for further research are made.  
 
1.2 The Ravintolakolmio Group 
The Ravintolakolmio group is a restaurant group that owns and runs 13 and co-
operates 4 franchised restaurants in the Greater Helsinki area. Ravintolakolmio was 
founded in 1979 by Heimo Keskinen, who still to this day owns the majority of the 
group, and works as the chairman of the board. In 2011, the turnover of the group was 
around 23 million euros, and the expected turnover for 2013 will be around 27 million 
(Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2012; 2013a). The group is made up of 8 limited companies 
(Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2012): 
 Ravintolakolmio Oy, operating three restaurants 
 Graniittiravintolat Oy, operating four restaurants   
 Oy Scanredi Ab, operating one restaurant 
 Ratello Oy, operating three restaurants 
 Oy Confetti Restaurants Ab, operating two restaurants 
 Diafora Oy, an accounting company 
 Restavuokraus Oy, owns the four franchising restaurants, and is the holding 
company that handles share trade in the group 
 Restasijoitus Oy, a second holding company. 
 
The Ravintolakolmio group’s values are customer loyalty, partner loyalty, profitability, 
constant development, and responsibility. They have a total staff of over 230 people, 
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and focus especially on staff satisfaction through educational programs and employee 
benefits. As part of its focus on staff satisfaction, they utilise the employee share own-
ership model. This is why the group is made up of many different limited companies. 
They currently have 21 partner-owners. (Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2013a.) 
 
1.3 Research Issues 
The objective of this thesis is to examine how employee share ownership works and 
what effects it has in the Ravintolakolmio group, as perceived by those in the program. 
The main question answered within is “what are the perceived benefits and drawbacks 
of employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio group?” This inquiry is supported 
by additional questioning of how the program rewards, how motivation and commit-
ment are affected, and how working with the employee share ownership program is 
different from the traditional way. The motives of program participants are explored. 
 
The hypothesis put forward in this thesis is that employee share ownership is a benefi-
cial system that increases commitment due to rewards received, which in turn increases 
revenue for the company. The definition and argumentation for employee share own-
ership as the term used in this thesis is presented in chapter 2.1.  
 
The issue of how employees perceive the benefits and drawbacks of employee share 
ownership within their company is significant, because it shows how the given rewards 
translate to the recipient. While the objective total advantageousness of the employee 
share ownership program is not examined, the participants’ perceptions are an im-
portant indicator of whether a) their valuation of the program corresponds with the 
employers’, b) there is a gap between the perceived value and the true value, and c) the 
program is worthy. 
 
The scope of the research is determined by a few factors. The first restriction on the 
scope is that the study is conducted completely within the Ravintolakolmio group, and 
does not include comparison to other restaurants or companies. The second restriction 
is that the sample group of the study consists of some of the mid- to upper-level man-
agers in the firm. The concept of employees contains within itself managers in this the-
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sis, while owners and the board of directors are considered employers. The third is that 
the focus is on their perceptions, and data is used to support these perceptions. The 
thesis will focus on the current situation mostly. Fourthly, only current and former 
partners will be interviewed, meaning that the views of non-participatory employees 
are not taken into account. 
 
This thesis provides the Ravintolakolmio group with a neutral, outside view of their 
employee share ownership system and allows employees to speak freely about their 
experiences with it. It can provide meaningful insight for the commissioning firm and 
its employees. The information in this thesis is only applicable to the Ravintolakolmio 
group. For other interested parties, especially restaurateurs, the thesis offers a glimpse 
at the system and its benefits. As issues such as corporate and contract law, and taxa-
tion are covered such as they are in Finland, the information is not valid for other 
countries. 
 
Since many issues in this study, for example profit, are usually judged comparatively, 
the main research problem is the lack of reliable and relatable comparison data. As the 
Ravintolakolmio Group uses the employee share ownership program fairly ubiquitous-
ly, there are no restaurants within the chain to use as a control subject. For these meas-
urements, the scale they are judged on will be based on the scales used by the commis-
sioning company. Thus, the accuracy of comparative judgements is dependent on their 
objectivity. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This thesis is a case study. This form was chosen due to its suitability to initial, explora-
tory qualitative research. It offers valuable insight through theories applied in practice, 
and explores issues in-depth with a specific context. However, case studies are empiri-
cally limited and can be hard to generalise. The type of research is descriptive, and aims 
to clarify the relationship between the subject matter (employee share ownership) and 
its effects, and show a factual picture of the situation. The research is limited to inside 
(emic) research within the company’s culture, structure and environment. As an out-
sider to the company - having never worked in it - I have a different degree of freedom 
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in my research, but also a different point of view. (Brotherton 2008, 12-13; 122-123; 
Brown 2006, 10-11; 45; Hirsjärvi et al. 2007, 130-131.) 
 
The research in this thesis is qualitative in nature, and is conducted through interviews. 
Qualitative research was chosen because the topic itself is subjective and multifaceted. 
The topic could be affected by social constructs, and qualitative research leaves room 
for interpretations to be made based on context. The aim of the research is to be as 
accurate and truthful as possible, though. As interviews are always cooperation be-
tween the researcher and the subject, and it must be taken into account that the inter-
viewer may unintentionally have an effect on the results, through their emotions, per-
sonality or question structuring. The interpretation of the results is also subjective in 
research like this, and the line between facts and personal judgements, whether by the 
subjects or researcher, may be unclear. This means that the validity of the research is 
high, yet reliability may be low. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2011, 21-24; 186-187; Brotherton 
2008, 39; Brown 2006, 14-16.) 
 
Interviews were chosen as the method of research as they are accurate, flexible and 
reliable, even if they mean a sacrifice of efficiency, economy, and generalizability. They 
are also commonly used and thus familiar to the research subjects. Interviews are good, 
because they help clarify and describe phenomena, require more thought and precision 
from subjects compared to surveys, and offer a higher percentage of usable answers 
while minimising refusals. The downsides of interviews are the time consumption, pos-
sible false answers due to subjects’ internal guidelines on social acceptability, subjects’ 
feeling of lack of anonymity, and the possibility for misinterpretation or misanalysis. 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2011, 34-36.) 
 
The interviews were semi-structured or focused interviews, where the questions are 
prepared but their order is open, and new directions of questioning that emerge are 
possible. The interviews were with key persons in the employee share ownership pro-
gram. Each interview was a one-on-one interview to protect anonymity and offer the 
appropriate atmosphere for even controversial answers. The interviews were conduct-
ed face-to-face in a place of the subject’s choosing, so that they feel comfortable. The 
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questions were designed to be directive, yet open-ended. The results from the inter-
views are compared to numerical data received from the commissioning party, to sup-
port or contradict interviewees, or give additional context. This numerical data consists 
of financial information, statistics and operational figures. (Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2011, 
47; 61; 90; Brotherton 2008, 132; 151.) 
 
The sample size required for this research is small, as generalisation is not the main 
concern but rather an in-depth investigation. Manageability was also an important fac-
tor in deciding sample size (Brown 2006, 66-67). Four main interviews, and one sup-
porting interview, were conducted. Samples were kept small, because the data is rich 
and subjective. There was no need to interview the whole population or sample ran-
domly, as the information needed is held by certain key informants. The main subjects 
of the research were chosen purposely, based on filling the following criteria: to have 
both supporters and opponents, of which some are long-term and others short-term 
participants and some still-involved and others no-longer-involved with the employee 
share ownership program. This purposive sample is reinforced by the supporting inter-
view of the owner-founder of the Ravintolakolmio group. (Brotherton 2008, 39; 171-
172.) 
 
The interviews were conducted between September 11th and October 1st, starting with 
the supporting data interview with the owner of the company, Heimo Keskinen, after 
which came three out of the four anonymous main interviews. One interviewee re-
fused to take part in the study, and since the sample was decided earlier by picking rep-
resentatives to match the varied criteria, a replacement was not acquired afterwards for 
two reasons; so as to not unintentionally manipulate the results of this study, and due 
to the difficult practicality of finding a replacement with similar experiences. Each in-
terview was tailored to suit the personal situation and answers of the interviewee. The 
interviews were conducted in Finnish, and recorded. The recordings have been saved. 
No transcripts though are provided of the interviews to protect the anonymity of the 
respondents. The interviews took between ½ - 1½ hours each. Both the average and 
median time of the interviews was 1 hour 10 minutes, and in total they took 4½ hours. 
In this thesis, the interviewees are referred to as A, B and C. 
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The purpose and nature of this study is to research the issues presented as a case study 
for the benefit of yours truly. The information in this thesis is not to be used against 
interests of the commissioning company. Views and conclusions are made to the best 
judgement of the writer. The qualitative research of the thesis was conducted, where 
appropriate, anonymously and confidentially. The aim of this thesis is to be as unbiased 
as possible, yet it is understood that not all objectivity and impartiality can be suspend-
ed. (Brown 2006, 16-17.) 
 
1.5 Key Concepts 
The key concepts presented in this chapter are terms that are used throughout the the-
sis, yet are considered as general or required previous knowledge. They are then used 
under this assumption in the text. These terms provide background understanding and 
context for the main issues covered in this thesis. The terminology introduced in this 
thesis, such as employee share ownership, is explained and described in the chapters 
pertaining to those subjects. 
 
Limited company: A limited company, osakeyhtiö in Finnish, is a formally founded 
and registered company with an asset worth of at least 2500€. The company must be 
split into shares. It must also appoint a board with a chairman. (Suomen Yrittäjät 
2006.) 
 
Share, shareholder: Shares are pieces of a company’s ownership. Each share is worth 
a percentage, depending on the ratio to total shares, of the company’s worth, which is 
determined by the company’s net asset value. A shareholder is a person who owns one 
or more of these shares. (Kennon, J. 2013b.) 
 
Net asset value: Net asset value is the value of a company’s assets minus its liabilities, 
according to its bookkeeping from the previous year’s end (Tomperi, S. 2007). 
 
Net asset value in taxation: Net asset value in taxation is the value of a company’s 
taxable assets minus its taxable liabilities, from the previous year’s end. This does not 
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include tax receivables or tax payables. In certain cases, some bookkeeping values are 
exempt from taxation calculations, but these cases are not essential to this thesis. 
(Finlex 2005.)  
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2 The Fundamentals of  Employee Share Ownership 
To fully examine the effects of employee share ownership, the groundwork of the sub-
ject must be studied first. In this chapter, the fundamentals of employee share owner-
ship are discussed. To wit, this includes answering the questions of what it is, how it 
functions, and why it is used. Shareholder contracts are investigated, since the extrinsic 
effects of employee share ownership are defined by the shareholder contracts between 
shareholders and the company. Ownership in practice is explored as it influences the 
intrinsic effects of employee share ownership. As the Ravintolakolmio group utilises 
two separate holding companies of sorts, the function and effect of holding companies 
in the context of employee share ownership are also examined. 
 
2.1 Employee Share Ownership 
Employee share ownership is a program employed by companies wherein at least one 
employee acquires equity shares, giving them shareholding status with their employing 
company and earning pay through those shares. Employee share ownership goes by 
many names; including employee stock ownership, profit sharing, employee or sharing 
ownership, and employee financial participation. In the Ravintolakolmio group, em-
ployee share ownership is called partner ownership. The scope of employee share 
ownership programs can vary from merely one employee up to 100% of the work-
force. Employee share ownership plans that cater to the whole workforce are usually 
specified as all-employee share schemes (Armstrong & Murlis 2007, 358). This thesis 
will focus on employee share ownership for particular individuals in an organisation, as 
the fundamentals and effects of employee share ownership remain the same. (Knyght 
et al. 2010, 1304-1305.) 
 
Rousseau and Shperling (2003) state that “employee share ownership provides em-
ployees with additional rights, such as the right to share in the company’s profits, ac-
cess to information about the company’s finances and operations and the right to par-
ticipate in the management of the company”, and all other standard legal rights of 
shareholders. This is done so that employee attitudes and behaviour will be altered to 
for example create better financial performance or improved productivity. Already in 
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1912, it was remarked that employee shareholders are more stimulated and responsible 
in their work, and still 100 years later, the assumption is that profit sharing and em-
ployee share ownership increases economic growth. (Knyght et al. 2010, 1305.)  
 
There are many different motives behind adopting an employee share ownership pro-
gram. They can range from financial and practical issues like motivating employees into 
cost minimisation, improving productivity and profitability, and linking compensation 
to company performance; to philosophical issues like improving equality and social 
justice, and increasing commitment to the work community. Employee share owner-
ship can also be considered a strategic competitive advantage, in terms of a highly-
committed workforce, and increased freedom in decision-making. In addition, it can 
provide insurance against termination from restructurings, meaning that employees in 
share ownership programs are less likely to be fired (Pendleton & Robinson 2011, 
444). (Knyght et al. 2010, 1311-1312.) 
 
Klein (1987 in McCarthy et al. 2010) outlines three ways that employee share owner-
ship can affect employees: via intrinsic, instrumental and extrinsic routes (see figure 1 
below). The intrinsic route means that share ownership on its own is enough to influ-
ence behaviour and attitudes. The instrumental route is the indirect effect that comes 
from sense of ownership and participation in company decisions. The extrinsic route is 
the influence caused by the financial returns received. (McCarthy, Reeves & Turner 
2010, 385-386; Pendleton, Wilson & Wright 1998, 101.) 
 
 
Figure 1. Employee share ownership causal model (McCarthy et al. 2010, 385.) 
  
12 
 
Those who advocate employee share ownership often believe it to increase identifica-
tion with the company, increase motivation, lower employee turnover, keep employees 
aware of competitive pressures, and increase employee participation (Pendleton et al. 
1998, 99-100). The benefits of employee participation are considered to be “improved 
economic performance, increased employee commitment, better productivity and prof-
itability and a greater sense of ownership on the part of employees”. One study states 
that employee share ownership has been shown to increase productivity by four per-
centage points, shareholder returns by two percentage points, and profits by 14 per-
centage points (Blasi et al. 2002 in Knyght et al. 2010, 1314). As a reward mechanism, 
employee share ownership is beneficial for employees due to the tax efficiency of 
shareholder dividends compared to earned income. (Horan 2002, 103-104.) 
 
On the other hand, Kohn (1993) states, that while rewards are effective at creating 
temporary improvements, they are ineffective at creating long-term changes in behav-
iour. Many workers may also see employee share ownership as merely an additional 
financial bonus without feeling commitment (Smith 2009 in McCarthy et al. 2010, 385). 
Kohn (1993) quotes studies that say that people, who learn to always expect rewards 
from their work, don’t perform as well as those who have no expectations. In other 
words, rewards can drive performance down over time. This is due to the manipulative 
nature of rewards; how people can feel punished when they don’t get the extra reward 
they were used to getting. High rewards can drive people to do work they are less in-
terested in, and being interested in their work is the best motivator. (Kohn 1993).  
 
Employee share ownership plans tend to guarantee longer careers for employees in 
their respective companies. This allows the long-term advantages of employee training 
to be realized, and companies can train firm-specific or even general skills more cost-
efficiently without risk of losing those skills to competitors. Employee share ownership 
plans signal to employees a guarantee they will not be exploited, increasing their inter-
est in commitment. This is supported by the fact that employees that own shares are 
more likely to have favourable attitudes toward their employer and be less likely to 
quit. (Pendleton & Robinson 2011, 440; 445.) 
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The effects of employee share ownership are dependent on a sense of ownership by 
the employee, as the feeling of ownership increases commitment and satisfaction. 
Studies show though that in general, ownership makes a difference, and those who feel 
like owners have significantly better attitudes and behaviour toward their employer. 
This sense of ownership may or may not arise from an employee share ownership pro-
gram though, and even when it does, it may not necessarily increase positive attitudes 
toward the work. (Pendleton et al. 1998, 101-102; 117.) 
 
Employee share ownership plans are often only one part of a company’s reward port-
folio, and having such a program is indicative of a firm’s intent on rewarding its pro-
ductive employees. It is also argued that the reason companies with employee share 
ownership programs do well is that those companies are more likely to be invested in a 
co-operative culture. Kakabadse & Kakabadse (2008) attribute the results of employee 
share ownership instead to capable leadership, well-trained management, well thought-
out HR policies, responsible governance and positive corporate social responsibility. 
(Knyght et al. 2010, 1305; 1313; 1316.)  
 
All in all, studies have found little to support the claim that employee share ownership 
directly affects employee attitudes, behaviour or commitment positively. The problem 
with studying the effects of employee share ownership is that the scope of profit shar-
ing programs is often too marginal, meaning that the amount of additional reward and 
control gained by the employee is negligible (Pendleton et al. 1998, 100). Rosen’s 
(2007) research, though, has shown that in closely held firms like family businesses, like 
the Ravintolakolmio group, employee share ownership consistently increases a compa-
ny’s performance. (McCarthy et al. 2010, 383-385.)  
 
Of course, it must be taken into account that the majority of the literature on the sub-
ject of employee share ownership is concentrated on publicly listed companies in the 
United States of America, meaning it may not be directly applicable to the situation 
discussed in this thesis. Much of the literature on the subject focuses also on employee 
share ownership plans that extend to all employees, but on the other hand the theoreti-
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cal framework in general seems to outline that the function for key employees is the 
same, as defined earlier. In the Ravintolakolmio group, employee share ownership is 
applied to the CEOs, restaurant managers and head chefs of the companies (Ravin-
tolakolmio-Ryhmä 2013c). As stated, employee share ownership can be applied to all 
employees of a company or merely just key employees, like in the Ravintolakolmio 
group. Based on the theoretical framework, I assume that employee share ownership is 
beneficial when applied to the whole workforce, even if only slightly, but that the ef-
fects are likely enhanced when utilised with key employees, for example managers, as 
they are already motivated and committed to begin with.  
 
Employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio group was created already over 15 
years ago, due to a need to rethink business strategy after the depression of the early 
90’s, when old tricks stopped working. Heimo Keskinen noticed then that “the owner 
of an establishment is second only to the gods, or in the case of a pub owner, second 
to none”. The aim of employee share ownership was to increase the commitment of 
key employees, and to increase the visibility of ownership to customers, so that the 
owner is always present at the establishment and is able to come by the customer’s ta-
ble, which was something that the major competitor, the S-chain, couldn’t do. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Some of the potential benefits for employers of employee share ownership plans are 
improved financial performance and productivity, improved employee performance, 
increased resilience, increased employee loyalty and commitment, improved staff moti-
vation, access to employee ideas for improvement and increased innovation capabili-
ties, reduced labour/management conflicts, reduced employee turnover, reduced wage 
demands, and a source of investment capital. Potential drawbacks are being accounta-
ble to employees, being under greater employee scrutiny, having to consider minority 
shareholder rights and opinions, having to provide financial information, and the time 
and cost of implementing and using an employee share ownership program. (Thomp-
son 1999, 2; Postlethwaite & Co 2013.) 
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The benefits for the employee can include access to company information, opportunity 
to make decisions, greater job scrutiny, improved job satisfaction, reduced la-
bour/management conflicts, increased job creation, opportunity to share company 
profits, and increased personal wealth and investment opportunities that are tax-
beneficial. The possible drawbacks for the employee are not having any impact on the 
business, possible loss of investment, not reaching profit requirements, and not being 
able to buy or sell the shares. (Thompson 1999, 2; Postlethwaite & Co 2013.) 
 
The employee share ownership program in the Ravintolakolmio group has a six month 
evaluation period before one is promoted to a partner. During this time, most prob-
lems, such as unsuitable partners, are eliminated. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
All interviewees stated that the reason they became partner owners was merely that it 
was part of the job description, and none had aimed specifically for it. “It was a natural 
continuum in my work, to move up to a more demanding level. I didn’t even know 
about it in the beginning, and I never aimed for it.” (B). “It was part of my job descrip-
tion, I didn’t think twice about it” (C). “I became a partner owner simply because it 
was offered to me. It wasn’t my intention or motive and partnership had no effect on 
my decision to come work here. I wasn’t originally even aware of it and I had never 
acquainted myself with it. Partnership had no effect on my decision to come work 
here.” (A). 
 
The interviewees felt that they weren’t pressured to become partners. “Since the first 
day, it was part of the job description, and it didn’t add or diminish any pressure. It’s 
just a part of the job” (A). Interestingly though, one interviewee answered, “There was 
no pressure to become a partner, per se, but there was no option to refuse” (C). Re-
gardless of the absence of pressure, the majority opinion was that it was an offer that 
couldn’t be refused. “There was no option to stay in the same job without partnership” 
(A). Not all agreed with this, though. One partner elaborated on the practical effects of 
refusal. “There was no pressure, but there was a choice to refuse and keep on working, 
but it would’ve been stupid. Refusal would’ve had no other effect except that probably 
they would’ve asked again later.” (B).  
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As to why they became partners, there was no clear motive, most likely due to the al-
most compulsory nature of partnership. “It is only offered to a few, as a thank-you for 
a job well-done, and of course I was interested. It’s a great accolade.” (B). “There was 
no reason not to become a partner” (A). Continuing this trend are the objectives that 
the partners listed they had. “I wanted to make the restaurant as successful as possible, 
and make it a nice and good workplace for the staff. I had no personal goals” (C). “My 
goal is to make an even more profitable company, get things better and keep the good 
feeling going with our customers being happy” (B). “If the company reaches its objec-
tives, so do I. I have no personal goals.” (A). 
 
The interviewees had varying views on the benefits of partnership, reflecting how dif-
ferent people can have diverse values. “The biggest benefit for me is the sparring help 
from other partners. You’re not left alone with issues, but instead there’s a community 
of similarly minded peers who are wrestling with the same issues.” (B). “It’s freer to 
work as a partner. Hopefully, it will offer financial benefits also.” (A). One former 
partner remarked, “Partnership had no benefits for me. Partnership has no practical 
significance, as there is no possibility to influence anything. There was nothing that 
could be done, so it was easier to not have the moral obligation.” (C). An interviewee 
also compared being a partner owner to working as just a basic employee. “There are a 
lot of professional differences between myself and my peers who are not partners” (B), 
which shows that there are benefits, at least by comparison. 
 
Only some saw any drawbacks with the system. “The drawback is that it takes your 
free time due to more work. Future planning and contacts continue after work hours.” 
(B). Others saw none. “There were no drawbacks for me. There’s nothing to lose, but 
the possibility to gain something” (A). Heimo Keskinen states that partners do have 
more work than non-partners, made up of extra tasks, meetings, and preparation, and 
in addition they also have to be more visible to the customer, as representatives of the 
company (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). One interviewee agreed, “Now I have 
more meetings and development discussions with my employees; and in general it’s 
more diverse. I have less time for the basic operational tasks.” (B). This was utterly 
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refuted by another interviewee, “Partnership had no effect on my responsibilities, tasks 
or powers” (C). This can be due to different attitudes toward both their old and new 
tasks, as one interviewee reminded. “It is important to stay attached to the operational 
work and know about any oversights” (B).  
 
All interviewees felt that employee share ownership is an important part of the Ravin-
tolakolmio group’s identity as an employer. “It’s an important thing that very few 
companies have. Such a small thing like partner ownership can have such a big effect.” 
(B). Even a former partner remarked, “Partnership is a good idea but was badly im-
plemented in the Ravintolakolmio group. If the situation was different: if the partners 
were skilled and professional, and actual practical decisions could be made, it would 
theoretically be great.” (C). On that note, though, the interviewees felt that partner 
ownership hadn’t changed at all during their time.  
 
The only change an interviewee could recall that had taken place was the addition of 
senior partnership. “A few years ago the senior partnership level was added, as a re-
ward to those who’ve worked for a long time” (B). Senior partnership is a system 
where after five years of being part of the employee share ownership program in the 
Ravintolakolmio group, employees are promoted to senior partners, who earn an addi-
tional pension, which they can receive if they stay in the company for over 10 more 
years (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013).  
 
The advantages that partnership gives to the company were clear to the interviewees. 
“Customers don’t have to look further than the restaurant for the owner” (A). “Own-
ership is visible from morning until night and someone is always here, and as a partner, 
you pay attention to the bigger picture” (B). One interviewee also brought up the vicar-
ious benefit of the company through personal changes. “The adoption of the corporate 
finances has affected my own objectives. If I was only responsible for my own unit’s 
results, I would principally be demanding new investments and feel that we need better 
tools. Because of partnership, I now understand where the money comes from.” (A). 
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In addition, the interviewees felt that there are no major drawbacks for employers from 
partnership. “There exists the possibility that if people do wrong things, it is personi-
fied in the partner, the present owner, and can lead to a bad employer image. If miscal-
culations are made in the recruitment or management of partners, it can have more 
dire consequences.” (A). “If a partner messes up, there can be bad deals and mistakes 
that can have massive financial consequences” (B).  
 
All in all, though, there has been very little discourse about partnership within the 
company, as one partner explained, “We’ve never discussed the benefits and draw-
backs of partnership in the company” (A). The information especially does not reach 
lower level employees, showing a certain lacking in the internal communications. “The 
staff knows that there are partners but I don’t know how much they know or what 
they should know; we’ve never discussed it” (A). “My employees don’t know how 
many per cent I have” (B). 
 
2.2 Shareholder Contracts 
A shareholder contract is a contract between two or more parties about the behaviour 
of the parties as owners of the company, and the use and control of shares. Sharehold-
er contracts are not compulsory by law, so the content and format of the contract is 
open. The aims of shareholder contracts vary a lot, depending for example on the size 
and business field of the company. Shareholder contracts can be made between two 
parties with half of total ownership each, or between the majority owner and minority 
owner(s). Limited companies do not need to reveal the content of their shareholder 
contracts. (Kyläkallio, K. 2011.) 
 
All shareholders are allowed the same rights within a company, unless the company’s 
articles of association state otherwise. Shareholder contracts must adhere to the Arti-
cles, and vice versa. Generally, these Articles are free to assign different rights to dif-
ferent shareholders, for example by limiting or increasing the rights to vote or receive 
dividends, and as long as the Articles state these differences in rights, shareholder con-
tracts can be made accordingly. The right to attend general meetings, and have items 
added to the agenda for processing, cannot be taken away, though. Also, according to 
  
19 
the law, the Articles or other decisions cannot be made so that they create a disad-
vantage or expense to only some shareholders. (Finlex 2006.) 
 
Shareholder contracts, and thus by proxy the articles of association, are vital in the 
context of employee share ownership, as the shareholder contract lays the groundwork 
for the rights and responsibilities of the shareholder, and sets the stage for both possi-
ble rewards and legal ramifications of the system. This means that the extrinsic benefits 
of employee share ownership are defined by the contracts essentially. 
 
The shareholder contracts of the Ravintolakolmio group have a standard format. This 
contract states that Heimo Keskinen, the owner of the company, owns the majority of 
shares either directly or indirectly, and that partners cannot sell their shares to anyone 
except Heimo Keskinen or a person of his appointing. Heimo Keskinen also agrees to 
buy all shares from a partner who wants to sell them. It also guarantees that if the 
company were to be sold to an external owner, the partners would be able to sell their 
shares as well. If a partner’s job ends, whether of their own volition or not, they are 
obligated to sell back their shares to Heimo Keskinen, meaning that they are unable to 
become long-term owners of the company. The resale price of the shares is determined 
as net asset value; or during the first three years of ownership, as purchasing price plus 
the Bank of Finland’s basic interest plus one per cent, whichever is lower. The Bank of 
Finland’s interest rate was added to the contract due to requests from existing long-
term partners who were worried that short-term partners would get fast returns 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). (Keskinen, H. 24 April 2013, 1-3.) 
 
There are two different categories of shares within Ravintolakolmio, K- and A-shares. 
K-shares are the majority shares, mostly owned by Heimo Keskinen, while A-shares 
are those the employee partners own. K-shares can only receive the same amount or 
fewer dividends than what A-shares receive. This is decided by the board annually. K- 
and A-shares each receive the right to the same amount of votes per share, one. “K-
shares have all the responsibility and money, but this is a positive thing since it allows 
us to reward A-shares with dividends without the company folding, when it can’t af-
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ford to reward everyone” (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). (Keskinen, H. 24 April 
2013, 1-3.) 
 
In typical shareholder contracts, an owner with over 90% of shares in the company 
may forcefully purchase minority shares (Putkonen 2013). In the Ravintolakolmio 
Group, though, Heimo Keskinen has the right to forcibly redeem the shares of part-
ners that break the contract through negligence or malice, or who are in bankruptcy. 
The shares can also be redeemed if all other signatories of the contract, excluding the 
partner in question, agree. For any breach of contract, the person is liable to a fine of 
100 000€. (Keskinen, H. 24 April 2013, 2.) 
 
The shareholder contract assigns the following responsibility to the partner: the in-
crease of company value and operations through the application of their expertise and 
contribution (Keskinen, H. 24 April 2013, 1). 
 
The content of Ravintolakolmio’s shareholder contract does not differ much from the 
average shareholder contract for a private company. Keskinen does agree that the con-
ditions of the contracts are fairly strong, though just to ensure that they can rid them-
selves of anyone that creates problems for them. The contract allows them to be strict, 
if there is a need, yet in practice they offer better terms. This flexibility is due to the 
ownership being directed through Restavuokraus, discussed more in chapter 2.4, as if 
they were sold by the company, the other shareholders could possibly object. He as-
sures that no partners that have left the company have lost money or similar. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
The interviewees stated that they didn’t familiarize themselves with the shareholder 
contract much, when they signed it. “I trust Heimo that I haven’t been cheated. I ap-
preciate the Ravintolakolmio group as a company so much that I doubt there could be 
any hindrance or nuisance to me.” (B). There was no dialogue as to the content either 
particularly. “We didn’t discuss the content of the contract or the percentage of owner-
ship. It was part of the job description” (A). On the other hand, some didn’t feel that 
there was any need for the dialogue. “The contract is fair and theoretically good” (C).  
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When questioned about the conditions of the contract, the current partners stated, 
“The conditions are harsh, but then again they have to be” (B). “The conditions of the 
contract were a given factor, and there is no use complaining. I haven’t even thought 
about full privileges. It is easier to just keep these and be satisfied. If you want more, 
you can found your own company.” (A). This is not to say that they wouldn’t feel dif-
ferently if presented with the contract now, as one interviewee put it, “Of course, if we 
were to negotiate the contract now after I have experience, I would take it more seri-
ously” (A). 
 
As to the harsh termination clauses in the contract forcing the partner to sell their 
shares back if their contract is terminated, one answered in accordance with Heimo 
Keskinen. “The owner has to be at the restaurant and not on Bali; otherwise the own-
ership has no value for the company and makes no sense. If you don’t work here, you 
have no need for the shares.” (A). 
 
The partners don’t feel any inequality from the different share categories. “It’s their 
privilege and I respect that. They’ve worked hard and their whole family is committed 
so they’re entitled to it. This is, after all, a family company.” (B). “It’s a normal situa-
tion. The owners have the will and vision which is implemented, and it has nothing to 
do with the letter-code of the shares.” (A). All agreed with this statement, though some 
continued about the practical effects. “I’m not jealous of the K-shares; it’s their com-
pany and their money. But it is a fact that A-shareowners have no power or jurisdic-
tion.” (C). “I feel there is no difference between the different share categories, but 
partners probably do have a lower status. Though, it isn’t due to the share categories 
but the authority position.” (A). “For some it could be an issue; they may feel unequal. 
In my opinion though, they are entitled to privileges; I feel no inequality.” (B). “If you 
focus on those things, you cannot do your job as well” (A).  
 
2.3 Ownership 
All limited companies must have annual general meetings where decisions by the own-
ers are made, such as the selection of the board of directors made up of owners, as by 
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law all limited companies must have one. The board of directors has general jurisdic-
tion over the company, meaning that they appropriately organise the management and 
function of the corporation, equalling to a lot of decision power. The board must have 
an appointed chairperson, and most often the board will also choose a chief executive 
officer, who handles the everyday operations of the company. The annual general 
meeting’s jurisdiction is limited to items in the limited company law, which does in-
clude the opportunity to change the bylaw of the company and thusly the distribution 
of jurisdiction. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy of a company, and how employee share 
ownership affects it. (Finlex 2006; Suomen Yrittäjät 2006.) 
 
 
Figure 2. Employee share ownership in the context of company hierarchy, rights and 
responsibilities. (Linnoinen 2013.) 
 
Employee share ownership offers employees an approach to management that they 
would otherwise be unable to experience. This right-to-the-source form of ownership, 
in my opinion based on the literature, may force employees, who normally merely per-
ceive themselves as only liable to their direct supervisor, to see to whom their supervi-
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sors, and thus they too, are liable: ultimately themselves. The degree of ownership, per-
centage, in a company can be assumed to affect the sense of ownership felt. 
 
Heimo Keskinen directly owns between 18% and 63% of each company within the 
Ravintolakolmio group, and 30% of Restasijoitus. The ownership of Restavuokraus is 
divided as 60% to Heimo Keskinen, 10% to his wife, and 15% to each of his children. 
This means that Heimo Keskinen’s total ownership of all the companies in the group 
equals 41.2%. His children’s total figure is 6.5% each. Partner employees directly own 
only between 1% and 8%, in other words 0.1% to 0.9% of total group ownership. 
Their ownership can be from shares in their own company and/or with the holding 
company, yet not in multiple operating restaurant companies. (Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 
19 April 2013; Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
In the early day of employee share ownership implementation, the group made two 
mistakes in their opinion, which have since been corrected: they gave too many shares, 
and to too many partners. Too many partners resulted in some, who were nice people 
that enjoyed partnership but didn’t give any extra output, merely riding the coattails of 
the rest. “Quality over quantity, you have to right-minded true owners, who dare to 
make decisions, and get the wheels turning in their own name.” Too many shares re-
sulted in uncontrollable growth of share value, making repurchase and resale difficult. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Heimo Keskinen says he has no problem giving out even large percentages of the 
company to partners, as it will produce higher yields for everyone, yet feels that the 
problematic issue lies with giving too much ownership to a single individual. The two 
per cent of shares is an easily controlled and regulated unit. In the end, all financial 
responsibility is with the Keskinen family. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
The board of directors in each company of the group is only made up of three people. 
Only some partners are on the board of directors. Functioning in place of the board, 
though, is an unofficial executive team, which is made up of all the owners. The execu-
tive team makes all the decisions, even though it legally can’t, and the board of direc-
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tors functions as a “rubber stamp” of sorts. Of course, theoretically above the board of 
directors should be the annual general meeting made up of shareholders, but it is prac-
tically replaced in the group with Heimo Keskinen and his family, because as the ma-
jority owner, he essentially has the power to override any decisions by the AGM and 
approves everything and ultimately has a veto right, which is the right to supersede any 
decision. All this is portrayed in Figure 3. Usually the CEO is promoted from within 
the company’s existing partners, though not always. The CEO can be on the board of 
directors simultaneously. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
 
Figure 3. Employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio group in the context of 
hierarchy, rights and responsibilities. (Linnoinen 2013.)  
 
One partner elaborated on the function of the board of directors. “Board meetings are 
not regular, the role of the board is not significant, and decisions are not made by the 
board outside of the normal statutory and financial statement issues. In practice 
though, the board is above the executive team and does have veto power over deci-
sions. The board of directors has no dialogue, only monologues by the Keskinens.” 
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(A). Another agreed, “The board of directors definitely has power” (B). There was also 
a connection between the board and a CEO’s responsibilities, ultimately confirming 
the board’s power. “If the CEO is not on the board, he’s merely an errand boy for the 
board. If he is on the board, though, he can execute mutually agreed schemes.” (A). 
 
Keskinen assures that being in the executive team offers employees totally new respon-
sibilities and tasks. “Large multimillion renovations are examined with the executive 
team, and once the project is over, the bills and budgets are inspected. They get true 
authority.” Heimo Keskinen evaluates that partners’ say is about 30% of decisions, 
especially since they have a different type of practical competence that the owners may 
not have. “Projects with a price tag of 10’s of thousands are dealt with by the executive 
team, but anything over 100 000€ is overseen and taken care of by me”, says Heimo. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
One of the partners explained the practicalities of the executive team. “The executive 
team is made up of the partners of that unit. The executive team gathers once a month 
with a tight agenda, where certain issues are handled. Issues that require discussion or 
need to be dealt with immediately are decided elsewhere and then brought before the 
executive team later. Depending on the issue, decision-making differs. If it is about 
internal processes, it is only declaratory. If it’s something visible to customers, it is dis-
cussed and approved or disapproved. If it is about corporate finances, it is discussed 
beforehand elsewhere as the executive team doesn’t have time to think about invest-
ments.” (A)  
 
Each of the partners felt that there was a lot of room for improvement with the execu-
tive team. “The executive team is a matter of its own. They only approve decisions that 
are in practice made elsewhere, in forums that are similar to but not the same as the 
executive team.” (A). “The executive team was not efficient, it was only playing and 
not real business. It was missing discipline and a guiding thought. It was futile. There 
were five partners on the executive team, but it wasn’t about business but about getting 
personal gains. Other partners were more interested in the status and the money, in-
stead of the responsibility or the attempt to make the company nice or profitable.” (C) 
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For the company, one of the big advantages of employee share ownership is the small 
administration it facilitates. “The partners run their restaurants as if they owned them 
completely, and they have many good suggestions on what to do, to choose from, in-
stead of me having to make them myself.” The Ravintolakolmio group only has four 
people working in administration out of a staff of 240, and of those four, two are often 
out in the field. This allows the company to save money on an expensive, cumbersome 
background organisation. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
For the employees on the other hand, one of the main advantages of partnership was 
seen as the position it brings within the company. “The main benefit of partnership is 
its authority, which stems from both the job and the ownership” (A). “The staff now 
perhaps view me more as a character that can do even more about things and are more 
respectful” (B). Some see it as something quite different from the traditional dynamic. 
“As a partner, you get to run the place as your own, but on the other hand, you have to 
run the place as your own. If you’re not a partner, you merely implement the given 
course.” (A). Anecdotally, it seems that partner owners’ position changes. “My col-
leagues feel that partners are higher up in the hierarchy, and they feel that I’ve come 
down a notch now that I’m no longer a partner” (C). “Partnership isn’t exaggerated but 
it is a certain type of merit, which brings respect and appreciation” (B). There was 
room for speculation on the on authority of partnership, as one interviewee deducted, 
“Mostly the directive authority over the staff comes from the job, and partnership is 
only a personal benefit” (A). 
 
Not all partners were as idealistic about the power they get. “As a partner, I only had 
nominal power by attending the executive team meetings. In the end though, Heimo 
Keskinen decided everything, and I couldn’t decide anything more than I could with-
out partnership, which is the operations of my own unit. In general, partners have no 
power. I had no say in big renovations.” (C). Another partner spoke along the same 
lines, “Big decisions like renovations are in bigger hands like Heimo Keskinen and the 
strategic executive team” (B). On the other hand, one felt that due to the minimal hier-
archy, there was the opportunity for a rapport. “My boss owns the whole company, 
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and I don’t have to go any further for permission if I want to do something. We have a 
low organisational structure, so things can always be discussed, instead of having to 
wait for a certain forum.” (A). “Decisions are made together, which means you have to 
be able to adjust to others’ decisions also, both in the executive team and the strategic 
executive team. You have to accept and commit to those decisions. Concretely I can 
affect the future with my opinions. The amount of votes you have affects the process 
of course, but I’ve always been able to express my own views.” (B). 
 
The partners get their decision power from uniting on new ideas. “The potential for 
influence derives from partners making joint decisions. In practice, it is better to be 
proactive, and have an idea ready which is then brought to the Keskinens and dis-
cussed together.” (A). Though, not all saw this as a negative issue. “It’s good that 
Heimo [Keskinen] is heavily involved with his wise and smart ideas, instead of being 
some great tyrant. Not all our ideas are good, so it’s good that not all are accepted.” 
(B). 
 
All interviewees agreed that the amount of partners shouldn’t be increased. “It’s good 
that there are certain limits to the amount of partners, sort of like a private club. Now 
we have an appropriate amount. Too many opinions create discord.” (B). The exact 
figure which they deemed as appropriate differed. Some felt that there should be less. 
“One partner per unit is more than enough” (C). “Three partners that get along well 
and whose cooperation functions, is good. Decision-making doesn’t turn to fighting.” 
(B). Mostly the issue seemed to be about flexibility and functionality of decision-
making, as one interviewee outlined, “Big units could have more partners and small 
units less. In total, 20-30 is an appropriate figure, so no more than there are now. That 
way there aren’t too many cooks spoiling the broth, and decision-making doesn’t be-
come cumbersome.” (A). The total number of partners may not be that significant, as 
one interviewee outlined, “There is no large common forum for all the partners” (A). 
 
2.4 Holding Company 
A holding company is a company that doesn’t have any operations of its own, but in-
stead owns assets. These assets can be for example shares in other limited companies. 
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Holding companies can be used as protection against debt, bankruptcy or lawsuits 
concerning the firm they own. If a company went bankrupt, the holding company that 
owns it would only lose the value of the investment, instead of all their other assets to 
pay for the bankruptcy. This way, companies with multiple business fields or ideas can 
protect their whole operations from the failure of one. Holding companies can also 
control operations through their ownership. In Finland, dividends paid from one pri-
vate limited company to another, for example a holding company, are tax free (Vero-
hallinto 2013a). (Kennon, J. 2013a.) 
 
If a company owns 50% or more of another’s shares, it is considered the parent com-
pany. This is true even if the ownership is indirect, aka through other subsidiaries. Par-
ent companies must publish the consolidated financial statements of all their subsidiar-
ies. The companies in the Ravintolakolmio group thus do not count as subsidiaries. 
The majority ownership of the group is divided between Restavuokraus, Restasijoitus 
and Heimo purposely to avoid creating a conglomerate (Keskinen, H. 11 September 
2013). (Finlex 2006.) 
 
The greatest advantage to having different companies, instead of subsidiaries, is the 
ability to keep the finances of each separate. Each company can then focus on its own 
operations and profitability. In a private limited company organisation, this brings 
about the biggest upside of a holding company, whereby the holding company (and its 
board) retain controlling power over the companies, yet only have non-controlling in-
terest financially. The degree to which the board of the holding company has a say 
within the companies it owns, is of course only the same percentage as their owner-
ship. If combined with direct ownership, though, it creates higher influence or even 
majority interest. Restasijoitus Oy owns between 10-15% of each company in the 
group, while for Restavuokraus Oy the figures are between 16% to just below 50%. 
(Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 19 April 2013). 
 
The members of Restasijoitus Oy are essentially made up of the CEO partners of the 
operating restaurant companies, with other especially good partners too. The people 
chosen have to have multitasking capabilities, with the holding company work coming 
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second after their own main job. The aim of the holding company is to utilise the ex-
perience and capabilities of the best employees throughout the group. “It is surprising-
ly meaningful to the partners to be part of this team, whose ownership is pervasive. 
No-one has left during the 8 to 10 years it’s existed, apart from one who became an 
entrepreneur but whom we work together with still.” (Keskinen, H. 11 September 
2013.) 
 
The partners involved in the holding company make up a strategic executive team, 
which overviews the whole group’s operation. They gather a few times a year and re-
view the results and strengths of the group, and make large multimillion euro annual 
contracts and deals. Being part of this team, they gain further responsibilities, powers 
and tasks. Partnership in the holding company rewards mostly through an increase of 
share value, as their annual dividends is kept minimal, which in practice means the tax 
free limit. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
The interviewees explained the practicalities of the strategic executive team. “They can 
handle big things – contracts, billings – and see how the group is doing. They make 
clever game-changing manoeuvres, and they don’t have too much power.” (B). “It 
mostly goes so that the strategic executive team makes decisions for the next six or 
twelve months, and then each unit implements that strategy. Big decisions are made in 
the strategic executive team, and the regular executive teams are merely a reporting 
forum. The Keskinen family makes decisions in the background, of which some are 
discussed and some are only announced. There’s nothing odd about it though, as 
they’re the ones with the big financial burden.” (A). 
 
The holding company and strategic executive team operations were viewed as too far 
removed by most to be practical to them at this moment. “I wasn’t part of Restasi-
joitus and know nothing about it” (C). “I’m not interested in being part of Restasijoitus 
at this moment in time, but maybe at some point in the future. In principal, I’m not 
saying no to anything but it is a big step, and even though it’s not compulsory, it’s part 
of the pattern.” (B). Even a partner who is part of strategic executive team considered 
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whether it was necessary, “I would’ve probably been satisfied without Restasijoitus 
shares, but it was part of my job description as CEO” (A). 
 
The strategic executive team isn’t without its problems. As one interviewee with expe-
rience of the team explained, “The strategic executive team could be more efficient. It 
has only been operating for a relatively short time. The hope is that it will be an effi-
cient and genuine decision-making forum, and I believe that in half a year to a year it 
will be. It is inefficient, because some of the decisions are made by the family before 
they are even brought to the table, and if you disagree, there is nothing you can do 
about it. If corporate management gives a commission, then there’s no point whining 
about it. You must upgrade your thinking to a possibility level; accept the situation and 
do what has to be done. Another reason is that Restasijoitus has too many partners and 
that’s why it’s inefficient. It should have a maximum of seven people.” (A). 
 
The proposed hierarchy of the company’s decision-making units is not fully utilised at 
the moment. “The aim is that the strategic executive team makes decisions and dis-
cusses issues that will happen in the next 7-12 months, the executive team issues in 3-6 
months, and local unit management 1-3 months. Getting to this mind-set and adopting 
this idea to everyone takes a little time.” (A). Whether or not the proposed hierarchy is 
the right vehicle for the company was brought up. “Perhaps this two-level system is a 
little too complicated for our company” (A). Others disagreed, and felt that the split 
chain of command works. “There is no contradiction between the strategic executive 
team’s decisions and my own, because the decisions I have to make are not big enough 
to create problems. They value opinions and I have the opportunity to bring them 
forth.” (B). 
 
Restavuokraus Oy; which functions as a holding company in addition to its normal 
operations, which include group sales, co-operation restaurant operations and devel-
opment; is owned completely by the Keskinen family. It conducts the share trade to 
and from partners, and as a part of its business operation is tax neutral. Restavuokraus 
shares are transformed from K-share to A-shares and sold to the partner. Heimo 
Keskinen exclusively decides who gets the shares and for what price, for better or for 
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worse. Each transaction lowers Restavuokraus’ share ownership, as new shares are not 
created. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Only one partner had any insight on the workings of Restavuokraus, and pondered 
why the set-up of the group is so complicated. “Contracts for the whole group could 
very well be made in Restasijoitus’ name instead of Restavuokraus. I don’t know why 
they want to circulate things through Restavuokraus – maybe it’s easier.” (A). Others 
had contemplated the same issues before, with poor outcomes. “One former partner 
was needlessly interested in the background workings of the company, and felt 
scammed and gossiped about it to the staff – and no longer works here” (B).  
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3 Extrinsic Effects of  Employee Share Ownership 
The effects of employee share ownership on employees can be divided into extrinsic 
and intrinsic effects. Intrinsic effects are the outcomes caused within the employee’s 
mind and influence, for example altered attitudes. Extrinsic effects are the tangible, 
external repercussions to the employee. The extrinsic effects studied in this thesis are 
share value, and dividends and their taxation. As this thesis focuses on employee per-
ceptions, issues such as changes in company productivity, profitability or efficiency, in 
other words things that an employee only has a partial or vicarious effect on, or vice 
versa, are not studied. In addition, Keskinen states that measuring whether sales or 
profit increases due to employee share ownership, is quite difficult (Keskinen, H. 11 
September 2013). 
 
In an employee share ownership program, the employee invests a certain amount of 
money into the company in exchange for a certain amount of shares, rewarding them 
with dividends. Dividends are not the only way shares can reward shareholders, as the 
value of shares also may grow, increasing an owner’s capital. Monetary rewards are 
seen as one of the main incentives of employee share ownership for partners 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). “At the end of the day, I hope to have received 
some monetary compensation, at latest if and when I change employers” (A). 
 
Heimo Keskinen does not feel that he, as a majority owner, is losing out on possible 
dividends or share value growth. “I don’t mind at all if someone leaves and I have to 
pay lots for shares, and I don’t mind giving out good dividends.” Sharing between 8-
10% of ownership with employees produces more for everyone, especially with such 
strong partners at the helm. He feels that employee share ownership has contributed to 
becoming the largest private company in the field. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
3.1 Share value 
The price of a private limited company’s shares can be determined by the bookkeeping 
value, the market value, the nominal value, or possibly some other price. The nominal 
value per share in Ravintolakolmio Oy, for example, was 500€, and the bookkeeping 
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value (or more accurately, the company’s assets minus liabilities) per share was under 
12 000€ (Keskinen, H. 24 April 2013, 5; 13). The market value is unknown, as it has 
not been evaluated, but in some cases it can differ greatly from the bookkeeping value 
(Kokko, J. 9 September 2013). The purchasing price of shares in the Ravintolakolmio 
group is set as the bookkeeping value (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). The 
bookkeeping value is determined by the balance sheet’s net asset value of the previous 
year, which is roughly calculated as assets minus liabilities (Verohallinto 2012). 
 
To pay for the shares, the partner owners must have previous capital of cash or contri-
butions in kind, which are for example assets that have a monetary value equal to the 
price, that are given to the company (Deloitte 2013). One can also take out a loan, 
which is quite common. The group often takes out its loans from the Nooa bank, 
where the partners personally receive credit for the shares and the transfer tax, with the 
shares themselves as collateral, with backing from Heimo Keskinen (Keskinen, H. 11 
September 2013). 
 
To determine share value (bookkeeping value in private companies), the net asset value 
is divided by the amount of shares outside the limited company. This is also used as 
the value of shares for direct ownership in the Ravintolakolmio group. The value of 
shares in Restasijoitus is calculated by determining the bookkeeping value of the res-
taurants and their three year EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation 
and Amortisation) average. The average of these two is calculated, and then the 10-
15% ownership portion of each of the restaurant companies. The values used for Res-
tasijoitus are closer to the true market value, but they are undervalued as some com-
mercial values are missing. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
If the net asset value per share goes up more than inflation annually, the value of the 
shares themselves will grow. For very successful businesses, this can be more valuable 
to employees in the long run than for example dividends. The downside to this, 
though, is that the value of the stock may go down as well as up, and as such relying on 
the value of shares as a reward can be quite risky. This risk is mitigated though some-
what for non-public companies as the value of the shares does not fluctuate as they 
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would on the stock market. The net asset value may increase or decrease, though, af-
fecting the share value. Due to large investments and economic downturn, the value of 
shares in the Ravintolakolmio group dropped in 2008 and 2009, yet otherwise has 
grown constantly (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). (Pendleton & Robinson 2011, 
445; 452.)  
 
Since for the first three years of ownership, the increase in value is maxed out at the 
Bank of Finland’s basic interest plus one per cent, there is very little monetary ad-
vantage to partners. The basic interest for the latter half of 2013 is 0.5% (Ministry of 
Finance 2013). After three years, even sizable profits from share value growth may oc-
cur. Current partners were optimistic about future gains and losses. Both stated they’re 
not scared of losing their investment. “The risk is quite low” (A). 
 
Heimo Keskinen feels that since the value of the shares is tied to the equity of the 
company, the amount of ownership does not matter that much to partners, as the re-
ward is mostly received from their profit-reliant dividends. Though, for restaurants that 
have heavy equity losses, they offer larger share portions as long-term compensation 
for no dividends. Both interviewed current owners disagreed with Heimo’s opinions 
on the amount of ownership. “Ideally I’d like to own double of what I currently have, 
so I could earn more money. My current ownership is too small” (A). “It’s possible 
and even preferable if I had more ownership, though the majority of the shares should 
stay with Heimo” (B). (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
One partner elaborated on the subject of matching their contributions with rewards. 
“The gains do not correspond with what they could be: they should be more. A small, 
few percentage of ownership does not compare to the amount of work that manage-
ment tasks require. There is too much work in comparison to what you get, or possibly 
partners just agree to take on too much. Perhaps they expect us to do more or I just 
believe that they do; either way, it feels like they expect reachability and unconditionally 
long days.” (A). 
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Heimo Keskinen stated emphatically, “No-one has lost money when leaving the part-
nership, so sometimes we’ve had to pay over price” (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013). 
This may not necessarily be true as one former partner owner recalled, “I ended up 
losing money over the partnership. It wasn’t financially profitable. Even though Heimo 
bought my shares back for more than they were worth, so that I wouldn’t lose as much 
money, I still lost money due to taxes” (C).  
 
The interviewees believed that an important part of partnership was the improvement 
of the company’s financial situation. “I hope to increase the company’s equity, get it 
efficient; and slowly things will get better. When the company finance improves, it’ll be 
great to see the shares grow. I hope the value increases a lot, and that’s something I 
can affect through my own work” (B). This view was ubiquitous, as a previous partner 
also stated “when I was a partner, my aim was to increase the company’s financial situ-
ation” (C). The results of this enthusiasm may not be that reassuring though in actuali-
ty, with one long-term partner stating “during the last four years, my share value hasn’t 
grown much” (A). 
 
3.2 Dividends 
Limited companies that make profit can pay out that profit to shareholders as capital 
income in the form of cash (Kennon, J. 2013c). A company cannot give out dividends 
if it compromises its ability to pay its liabilities, and the company must have the liquidi-
ty to pay the dividends. Dividends are typically paid from retained earnings. The board 
of the company make a suggestion for the amount of dividends paid, or whether to 
even pay any, and the shareholders at annual general meetings decide on it. If no divi-
dends are paid, the money can be reinvested into the company, for example. (Finlex 
2006.) 
 
Paid dividends to partners are based on a written profit agreement, so that it is tied to 
the company’s profit. Keskinen feels that this makes the partners better achievers. It 
may not necessarily be working as intended. “Since dividends are paid based on the 
profit agreement, we haven’t made enough to receive any dividends” (A). “When sign-
ing the contract, we talked about the amount of dividends we’d receive after certain 
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earnings, but I don’t remember” (B). If the company makes especially good profit, the 
board can hand out even more dividends than required by the agreement. Annually the 
dividends are paid in a sum that at least covers loan interest and amortisation. If there 
are no dividends to be paid, Heimo Keskinen loans the amount required for the inter-
est payments. Heimo states that on average, annual dividends paid range from 4000€ 
to 15000€ per person, whom can own between 1-8%, as stated. “It is quite a substan-
tial addition to wages in this field, especially when you take into consideration the 
growth in share value.” As one interviewee put it, “money is nice but more money is 
nicer” (A). (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Some agreed with Heimo. “It’s a nice addition to my paycheck” (B). “The main ad-
vantage of partnership was a certain addition to my wages, even though in actuality I 
never received any dividends” (C). On the topic of wages, though, the views of man-
agement and employees differed, as while Heimo Keskinen stated that one of the main 
goals of partner ownership was “an additional reward on top of a competitive wage” 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013), one partner disagreed with the whole statement, 
“even the wages in this company are not competitive, when compared with other 
companies, and then in addition I received no dividends” (C). 
 
The estimates of dividends the interviewees had were not substantial, either, and did 
not match the 4000€-15000€ estimates given. “I haven’t earned any dividends, and be-
ing a partner hasn’t affected my wealth in any way” (A). “I’m not planning on buying a 
Ferrari. It would be nice if I got something though” (B). “I only received enough divi-
dends to pay for the loan interest” (C). On the bright side, there was room for altruistic 
optimism. “It would be fantastic if we could also reward the staff and not just part-
ners” (B). 
 
3.3 Taxation of Dividends 
In Finland, dividends are taxed separately from earned income like salary, and then this 
capital income is taxed differently depending on whether the company giving out the 
dividends is a publicly listed company or a private limited company (Veronmaksajat 
2013). Taxation of private limited companies will be the focus, as the Ravintolakolmio 
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group is made up of them. The Finnish government has suggested new taxation prin-
ciples to be adopted in 2014, and the new suggestions will be used in this thesis. 
 
Taxation of capital income was introduced in Finland in 1993, when it was separated 
from earned income. In 2005, the imputation system of corporate tax, where paid cor-
porate tax was credited as paid tax for the recipient of dividends, was abandoned. This 
system entitled recipients of dividends to tax returns if their own capital income tax 
rate was lower than the corporate tax rate. In 2006, the wealth tax was abolished. As of 
2011, Finland has the third highest tax rate on personal capital income such as divi-
dends in Europe, after Great Britain and Ireland (Kröger 2011, 16-17). This shows that 
taxation on capital income over time has become harsher since the 1990’s, when it was 
at its lowest, as a tax fix due to the depression. The new suggestions for 2014 seem to 
be continuing this trend of tax increases. (Verohallinto 2009, 8-10.) 
 
Taxes on dividends are paid by the recipient. A person or legal entity may receive up to 
8% of the private limited company’s net asset value in dividends with certain tax 
breaks. Of the 8% of the company’s net asset value in taxation that is under 150 000€ 
in value, only 25% of it will be taxed as capital income, while 75% will be tax-free. For 
any amount over 150 000€ but still within 8% of the net asset value of the company, 
85% will be taxable as capital income. Any amount over 8% of the net asset value of 
the company, 85% will be taxed as capital income. The capital income tax is 30% for 
annual amounts under 40 000€, and 32% for over 40 000€. This is the case for a share-
holder with shares in only one company. If a shareholder owns multiple companies, he 
or she can receive up to 150 000€ from all companies to receive the lower tax rate. Yet 
this 150 000€ must be comprised of paid dividends per share that do not exceed 8% of 
the net asset value per share. Figure 4 below illustrates the taxation of dividends. 
(Veronmaksajat 2013.) 
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Figure 4. 2013 Proposed taxation of dividends (Linnoinen 2013) 
 
The percentage of net asset value is always calculated as if the dividends were paid to 
all 100% of shares similarly, according to the highest paid amount. The paid dividends 
must be under 8% of the net asset value per share, in other words. To clarify, if you 
pay 100€ dividends to an owner of 1%, the percentage of net asset value will be calcu-
lated as 10 000€ (the value of 100% of shares) in ratio to the total company’s net asset 
value. This means that when calculating taxation of dividends, the net asset value per 
share should be utilised. This was an issue that surprised Heimo Keskinen, since their 
reward strategy is heavily focused on paying different amounts of dividends to differ-
ent category owners, and originally thought wrongly that paid dividends in total had to 
be less than 8% of the company’s total net asset value (Keskinen, H. 11 September 
2013).  
 
These tax guidelines mean that a company with a net asset value of 1 875 000€ can 
hand out 150 000€’s worth of dividends of which only 25% will be taxed as capital in-
come. If this 150 000€ is given to one person, they will pay 30% income tax on 
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37 500€ and receive the rest, 112 500€ tax-free. After taxes, they would receive 
138 750€. This means that they will have paid a total of 11 250€ in taxes, equal to 
7.5%. 
 
If the same company gave out 200 000€, they would pay taxes on 25% of 150 000€, 
37 500€, and on 85% of 50 000€, 42 500€. This one person would then pay 30% in-
come tax on 40 000€, and 32% on the second 40 000€, and receive 120 000€ tax-free. 
After taxes, they would receive 175 200€. Taxes paid will have been 24 800€, equal to 
12.4%.  
 
If that company gave out 200 000€ in dividends to two people instead of one, each 
would tax 25% of 75 000€, and 85% of 25 000€, respectively 18 750€ and 21 250€: 
40 000€ in total. They would pay 30% income tax, and receive 28 000€ in addition to 
the tax-free parts of 56 250€ and 3 750€. This means that each would gain dividends in 
total of 88 000€. Taxes paid are 12 000€, aka 12%. These two owners could also poten-
tially receive from another similar company the exact same amounts, 75 000€ of which 
25% and 25 000€ of which 85% is taxable, totalling 150 000€ with the lower tax and 
50 000€ with the higher, because the personal limit for the lower tax rate is 150 000€ 
per year. Yet if they received similar dividends from a third company, they would pay 
taxes on 85% of the whole 150 000€. 
 
If the company’s net asset value is only 937 500€, half of the previous example, and 
they also gave out 150 000€ in dividends. 8% of the net asset value would be 75 000€. 
25% of 75 000€ would be taxable, and the other 75 000€ would be 85% taxable. In 
total 82 500€ would be taxable; the first 40 000€ at 30%, and the rest at 32%. 25 600€ 
is the total of taxes paid, equalling 17%. 
 
This shows that in Finland, individuals with shares in companies with large net asset 
values and relatively low paid dividends have the most beneficial tax situation. The 
highest tax rates affect those who own shares in companies with small net asset values 
and relatively high paid dividends. It is also beneficial, from the point of view of mini-
mising tax expenses, to have multiple recipients if the taxable income is more than 
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40 000€, so as to avoid the higher rate. All in all though, any capital income is essential-
ly cheaper for both the employee, as the tax rate for capital income is often lower than 
for earned income (the only exception being those with very small annual earned in-
come), and for the employer, as it does not require the payment of subsequent em-
ployment fees, which can be even 50% of the wages. Capital income does not though, 
as opposed to earned income, accrue pension for the employee. 
 
Many different deductions can be made to one’s taxes. Some of these are already de-
ducted by the tax administration, while others have to be declared. Of the deductions 
available, those that are applicable for this study that a person can deduct from his/her 
capital income are the following expenses: cost of acquiring income, interest payments 
of loans for the share purchase or other loans, and voluntary pension insurance con-
tract costs. Deductions are taken from the net total of taxable income. (Finnish Tax 
Administration 2011.) 
 
The net asset value of Ravintolakolmio Oy, one of the companies within the group, 
was around 1 066 015€ in 2008 (Keskinen, H. 24 April 2013, 13). 8% of that would 
amount to 85 281€. Since there are 3 partner owners in Ravintolakolmio Oy with 2% 
each, each partner could earn 1 705€ annually in dividends for the most tax-efficient 
situation. With dividends upwards of 4000€, taxes paid would be around 713€ or 18%, 
which is quite high. 
 
Heimo Keskinen feels that the equity of the companies is quite good, which means it is 
beneficial for taxation. Income taxation is something, though, that does not and has 
not affected the dispensing of dividends, as Keskinen believes that it is each recipient’s 
own issue. On the other hand, the employees themselves have been interested in fa-
vourable taxation, and made suggestions thusly. The new taxation principles will not 
create any changes in their strategy, apart from organising an education session for the 
partners about it. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
None of the interviewees were acquainted with capital income taxation, which ren-
dered any further questioning moot. “I haven’t familiarised myself with the taxation at 
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all. I am terrified of my tax return” (B). One participant felt sure they’d go through it 
with the executive team at some point, while another said they hadn’t gone through 
things like taxation ever. On the subject of taxation, they had vague approximations. “I 
guess capital income is more beneficial than earned income” (B). It may be that they 
will not earn dividends regardless, as one long-term partner contemplated “we may get 
the extra profit as earned income so that the balance sheet’s equity isn’t affected by 
paid dividends” (A). To reiterate, this means that as dividends can only be paid from 
profits, if the company makes losses no dividends can be paid. There are no such re-
strictions on paying wages, as long as the company’s cash flow is adequate, and this is 
what the Ravintolakolmio group seems to be doing in some cases.  
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4 Intrinsic Effects of  Employee Share Ownership 
The intrinsic effects of employee share ownership are harder to measure directly than 
the extrinsic, financial ramifications. Employee share ownership though has a pro-
found outcome on the attitudes and behaviours of employees, as described earlier in 
chapter two. The financial repercussions are, in actuality, mostly a consequence of the 
change in employee performance and mind-set, yet on the other hand, they also affect 
motivation, as shown in figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Employee share ownership cycle of effects (Linnoinen 2013) 
 
Employee share ownership affects motivation, commitment and management style; 
which in turn discourage absenteeism, employee turnover, and encourage job satisfac-
tion (Niermeyer & Seyffert 2002, 111; Lampikoski 2005, 27). Motivation is closely re-
lated to commitment, and the same external factors that affect them; such as level of 
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pay, relationship with leaders, fairness, and communication; also affect absenteeism, 
employee turnover, and performance meaning all these subjects are connected (Phillips 
& Connell 2003, 225). 
 
In the Ravintolakolmio group, taking care of human capital is an important strategic 
goal. They evaluate how they are doing on this front by measuring things like job satis-
faction and management, with their own management index. In addition, they track 
employee turnover and absenteeism. In this chapter, the topics addressed are motiva-
tion, commitment, as a necessary building block of the topic, and the four factors they 
track within the company: job satisfaction, employee turnover, absenteeism and per-
formance. (Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2013a.) 
 
4.1 Motivation 
Motivation is not a trait that some possess and others do not. Motivation is affected by 
many factors and is the result of a complex process. The four main factors that affect 
motivation are the intensity of the motivator, whether it be a self-set goal or a possible 
reward; the belief in one’s own influence on the outcome, i.e. can it be achieved; psy-
chological time perspective, which means that at different times in one’s life different 
issues are seen as important; and emotional intelligence, which is the whole spectrum 
of internal feeling a person has to help them make decisions. (Niermeyer & Seyffert 
2002, 12-14.) 
 
Motivation at work is derived from two ways: intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. Intrinsic 
motivation comes from the satisfaction or goal-fulfilment from the work itself. People 
are driven to work in fields and/or jobs that satisfy them: meaning that intrinsic moti-
vation is self-generated. Management can have an effect on it too through their values, 
policies, practices and empowerment. Responsibility, freedom and control over one’s 
own resources are examples of concepts that attribute to intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic 
motivation is caused by the things done to and for someone for their motivation. This 
includes rewards, praise, promotions and pay. (Armstrong & Murlis 2007, 59-60; Sis-
tonen 2011, 25.) 
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The motivational effect of financial rewards shouldn’t be underestimated, though. 
Greer (2001) shows that research definitively proves that incentives improve perfor-
mance in all types of work, and that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are in no way 
opposites. A long-term bonus, such as employee share ownership, not only motivates 
employees financially, but because they symbolise that the employee is part of the 
company’s long term success and future plans. They show that employers want to 
commit to those employees, and receive the same commitment vice versa, causing the 
employee to create a stronger emotional bond with the employer. (Greer 2001, 259; 
Niermeyer & Seyffert 2002, 93-94; Viitala 2009, 159.) 
 
On the other hand, a comprehensive study of research results on the effects of rewards 
on motivation found that extrinsic rewards can even lower commitment and achieving 
goals. This is explained by the controlling and pressuring nature of reward schemes, 
which limit employees’ self-determination in their work. Money’s motivation effect 
lessens the higher up you go in the hierarchy, meaning managers are less motivated by 
increases in monetary rewards than low-level employees. Another five year study 
showed that executive compensation was not correlated to corporate results (Sistonen 
2011, 21). (Viitala 2009, 159.) 
 
According to Heimo Keskinen, partner employees become much more motivated and 
braver. They have more ideas, keep better track of their competitors, and try to stay 
current. They have the courage to make decisions, create profit, and take chances. One 
of the major benefits for partners is the opportunity to see the inside workings of the 
company and be a part of the decision-making process. “They get to see and be part of 
things they wouldn’t otherwise. They get to grow as business people.” One of the in-
terviewees agreed with Heimo Keskinen. “Personally I want to learn and grow as a 
business person, and get as much as possible out of and challenge myself. That’s why 
I’m interested in learning about balance sheets and income statements.” (B). 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Each of the interviewees felt that even before becoming partners, they were already 
invested in the company and their work. “I’ve always been entrepreneurial, thought 
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things through for the best interests of the company, and paid attention to competi-
tors, instead of just the bare minimum required” (B). “I’ve always worked in an entre-
preneurial way, so it wasn’t a significant thing for me. Some may place some signifi-
cance on being an owner, though” (C).  “There was no sudden overnight change and 
I’m still the same person, but I am positively influenced by my partnership, more mo-
tivated, even though I’ve always been responsible” (B). 
 
They disagreed on the effect that partnership has had on their work input. One stated, 
“I work harder now, and even though I’ve always been the type to read emails at 
home, my work has changed” (B). Another interviewee felt oppositely. “Working as a 
partner owner is in no way different from working as an employee. Actually, when 
you’re not a partner you get to work more freely, because you have no emotional bur-
den.” (C). A third interviewee saw that there were practical changes, both positive and 
negative. “The job description is freer but more demanding time wise. You have more 
freedom but also more power and responsibility. The requirements of work standard 
and face-time are tougher than for mere employees. For example, representation to 
customers is more bound to a partner’s tasks than for non-partners.” (A). 
 
The motivation partners feel has changed over time, in both directions of the spec-
trum. Positively, one partner considered, “My own opinion about partnership has 
changed over time. I’ve seen that it’s beneficial and has tangible value, and now I’m 
thrilled about it. I want to be in the room where the decisions are made. Partner-
ownership makes the good better, but adds more pressure when things are bad, than 
for a normal employee.” (A). On the other hand, a former partner’s feeling had 
changed in the opposite way. “My motivation increased when I sold my shares back, 
and could stop worrying about pointless things” (C). This partner also believed that the 
motivational effects that employee share ownership may have, are not always positive. 
“Partners believe they’re more than they are. A boss is a boss with or without owner-
ship.” (C). 
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4.2 Commitment 
Organisational commitment has long been documented to be related to employee 
turnover so that lower commitment equals a higher likelihood of leaving. According to 
Phillips & Connell (2003, 224-225), the three main forms of commitment are: 
- Commitment to the company; how much an employee aligns themselves with 
the company’s goals, values and practices. 
- Commitment to the profession; how much a person identifies themself with a 
certain type of work, regardless of the company they work in. 
- Commitment to others; how a person feels about their co-workers, and the im-
portance of those relationships. 
All three forms of commitment are separate from each other. For example, an employ-
ee can be highly committed to their company without being committed to their profes-
sion. Yet all forms of commitment have an effect on the total commitment to an or-
ganisation. Job satisfaction also increases commitment. (Phillips & Connell 2003, 224-
225.) 
 
Lampikoski (2005, 48-50) describes many more types of commitment; such as emo-
tional commitment to the organisation and its employees; true commitment to compa-
ny values and strategies; norm commitment or in other words a sense of duty and in-
debtedness; perk-based commitment to the rewards and perks received; commitment 
to the work and tasks; commitment to the career and opportunities; commitment to 
the work environment and location; formal commitment, where commitment is mostly 
light and self-serving; compulsory commitment due to obligation or necessity; and re-
turn commitment, where outgoing employees may possibly return. An employee may 
also have a profound lack of commitment, where they merely do the required mini-
mum. The intensity and type of commitment employees have changes over time, and 
during different situations and stages. It is an important issue though, because commit-
ted employees promote innovativeness and flexibility among other more straight-
forward bonuses, such as increases in efficiency. (Lampikoski 2005, 27; 48-51; Viitala 
2009, 89.) 
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For a person to feel committed to their work, certain variables must be appropriate. 
The person subconsciously goes through a process of decisions to determine whether 
commitment is beneficial for them. The work they are committing to must have results 
that will be significant for them, an undecided outcome, a chance for them to affect 
the outcome, and positive effects from the outcome. If each of these variables is real-
ised, energy can be invested and the employee will commit. If one or more issues have 
a negative answer, little or no energy will be invested. (Niermeyer & Seyffert 2002, 19.) 
 
Heimo Keskinen feels that commitment is one of the biggest advantages of employee 
share ownership for their company. Heimo states, “Normally recruitment is expensive 
and drains resources, especially at the top, but shareholder partners barely ever 
change.” He feels that it creates a better continuum for the company, when there isn’t 
too much turnover. On the other hand, he also knows that employee share ownership 
may frighten partners. “They are scared that too much commitment will be demanded 
of them, and that they will have to work day and night. They are scared that their work 
contribution isn’t big enough.” (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
All of the partners understood that the main advantage for their employer is their 
commitment. “The main advantage for the employer is the commitment and interest 
of the employee. It’s to an employer’s benefit that there’s always an owner on shift.” 
(B). “They get committed people who altruistically work longer. If you compare to 
other employees, partners are clearly the more committed in the organisation.” (A). 
This is not to say that the company’s benefit is separate from the individual’s. “I appre-
ciate that the company is trying to commit us to the organisation, and I hope to stay 
here for long” (B). “When I started as a partner, I expected committed people who 
worked together” (C). 
 
This commitment does work as intended, as each of the partners felt that leaving was 
now harder. “It’s not as easy to leave anymore. I’m not stuck in a negative sense; it’s 
more like getting married. I’ve been committed for long, but this is the final nail in the 
coffin; no longer can I look at others.” (B). “Partnership is a committing factor. I’m 
more anchored to this business than without it.” (A). Not all viewed this as a positive 
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factor, though. “The main drawback of partnership was the emotional effect of it: the 
commitment. I felt that as an owner, I was more bound to and responsible for the op-
eration, even though it [employee share ownership] had no practical significance.” (C). 
Yet regardless of the perceived commitment, partners feel that they have the oppor-
tunity to leave, if not the desire. “I don’t feel the need to change employers, but if 
someone offers a great opportunity, I may go check it out, even though leaving is 
harder due to partnership.” (B).  
 
4.3 Job Satisfaction 
Job satisfaction is an important factor in motivation and has long been linked to high 
levels of employee retention (Greer 2001, 15). Phillips & Connell define job satisfac-
tion as “the degree to which employees are content with the job that they perform”. 
Job satisfaction is made up of five parts: satisfaction with the work itself, salary, pro-
motion opportunities, supervision, and co-worker relationships. (Phillips & Connell 
2003, 94; 153-154.) 
 
At its simplest, job satisfaction can be measured on a single-item scale with an individ-
ual question for each five factors of satisfaction. Employees are asked how satisfied 
they are with the work itself, with their pay, with their opportunities for promotion, 
with their leadership, and with their relationships with their co-workers. More compli-
cated, longer questionnaires can be used to truly investigate the cause of job 
(dis)satisfaction. (Phillips & Connell 2003, 155.) 
 
Opsahl and Dunnette (in Armstrong & Murlis 2007) point out that the salary and fi-
nancial rewards were listed as the major reason for job satisfaction 19 per cent of the 
time, as a long-term factor in job satisfaction 22 per cent of the time, and as a short-
term factor 5 per cent of the time. In comparison, it was listed as the major cause of 
dissatisfaction 13 per cent, and as a long-term dissatisfying factor 18 per cent of the 
time. They conclude that money has the opportunity to function as either a satisfier or 
a dissatisfier. The effectiveness of monetary rewards, that cause job satisfaction, is de-
pendent on the meaningfulness of the reward. Meaningful rewards that motivate and 
satisfy come when they are in line with performance measurements, so that the em-
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ployee and the employer agree on the level of performance and thus the suitable re-
ward (Phillips & Connell 2003, 193). In other words, fairness is the key to meaningful 
rewards. (Armstrong & Murlis 2007, 65-67.) 
 
Job satisfaction in the Ravintolakolmio group was on average 3.99 on a scale of 1-5, 
answered by 70% of the staff, in 2013 (Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2013b). Job satisfac-
tion isn’t measured separately for different staff groups at the company as it is anony-
mous, but a separated system is in the works. Heimo Keskinen feels that partner em-
ployees are more satisfied with their work, and that for example all the people waiting 
for a place in the employee share ownership program speak volumes about the good 
things partners have to say about it. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Keskinen also notes that job satisfaction changes over time. During economic growth, 
bonuses, benefits and wages are the most important factor. During economic down-
turn, it is much less important, losing out to many other factors, including job security. 
Thus, monetary rewards are less important currently. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 
2013.) 
 
None of the partners could definitely say if ownership affected their satisfaction posi-
tively. The closest was, “Employee share ownership has probably had a positive effect 
on my job satisfaction” (A). Another answered more neutrally, “I’ve been satisfied for 
a long time, and partnership had no effect on it” (B). The third felt that it was harmful. 
“Partnership had a deteriorating effect on my job satisfaction. The knowledge that I 
should affect things that I couldn’t affect, lead to severe frustration. Employee share 
ownership was a burden that made work harder.” (C). 
 
One indicator of satisfaction with employee share ownership is whether or not one 
would recommend taking part in the system to others. “I’d recommend it if someone 
was interested and specifically asked me about it. I wouldn’t go to the market and try 
to sell it. I also wouldn’t recommend for someone to come work in this company be-
cause of partnership.” (A). “I would recommend it to a peer, but not to a waiter. I 
hope that other supervisors become partners in the future, because it’s an advantage 
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for customers.” (B). Even the former partner was open to recommending the program. 
“The company is more professional now, and in a different situation, I would recom-
mend partnership. Personally, I wouldn’t unreservedly join, but as a concept, if some-
one is interested, definitely.” (C). 
 
4.4 Employee Turnover 
Employee turnover is defined as the percentage of employees who leave an organisa-
tion. This is further divided into avoidable and unavoidable turnover, so that focus can 
be placed on the avoidable kind. Unavoidable turnover is caused for example by 
changes in family situations, retirement or injuries, while avoidable turnover is caused 
by poor conditions at work, lack of job satisfaction and bad management. Further-
more, from the employee’s perspective turnover can be voluntary, for example a career 
change, or involuntary, e.g. military service. Employers only have an effect on avoida-
ble and voluntary turnover. For example, low pay accounts for 43% of the reasons 
given behind employees leaving a company. (Phillips & Connell 2003, 40-42; 243.) 
 
In addition to the pull effect of outside forces and the push effect from within, enticing 
employees to change jobs, there exist factors within the workplace that help keep them 
committed to their current employer. Some of these factors include career opportuni-
ties, emotional bonds, meaningfulness of the work, atmosphere, certainty of employ-
ment, position of authority, job tasks, and monetary compensation. Philips & Connell 
(2003, 184) state that monetary compensation has a clear and reliable impact on em-
ployee turnover, while Sistonen (2011, 123) states that intangible elements are central 
and undeniably the most important to turnover, and tangibles such as money come 
second. Employee share ownership has a profound effect in either case, as it directly 
affects the monetary compensation and position of authority of an employee, and indi-
rectly the rest. (Niermeyer & Seyffert 2002, 114.) 
 
Employee turnover is calculated by taking the amount of employees who have left and 
dividing it by the total amount of employees during that period of time, and can be 
calculated for a certain group or for employees as a whole (Lampikoski 2005, 126). A 
turnover figure under 10 per cent is considered good for a high-mobility field like the 
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hospitality field (Lampikoski 2005, 17). Employee turnover is expensive for companies, 
as they must recruit new employees. This includes a whole range of expenses: wage 
bonuses for incoming and outgoing employees, media fees, recruitment rewards or 
head-hunter fees, and used man hours on recruitment and initiation (Monster 2013). 
The annual cost of replacing a professional is estimated at 1½-2 times annual salary 
(Lampikoski 2005; 136), while a recruitment agency places the price of hiring a new 
sales manager at 48 216€ plus side expenses (Evecon Trainers Oy 2013). 
 
The advantages to having low employee turnover include lower expenses for recruit-
ment, selection and orientation; a better image of the company for other potential re-
cruits; the retention of key information, skills, experiences, inventions and patents 
within the organisation; the retention of customer relationships; and consistency or 
improvement in efficiency, competitive advantage or productivity. On the other hand, 
employee turnover can have positive outcomes too, such as a curative effect of chang-
ing the staff and bringing in new, even better employees (Viitala 2009, 90). (Lampikoski 
2005, 13.) 
 
The target for staff turnover in the Ravintolakolmio group is 20%, and at the moment 
it’s at 28.5%. It is divided so that 25% of the turnover is made up of basic staff mem-
bers, of which many are students or other part-time, both in length and frequency, 
employees. Both the turnover target and current turnover for supervisors is 15%, and 
for partner owners it is 5%. This equals to one partner change annually. The difference 
between supervisors and partner owners is triple, though most supervisors are a level 
beneath the partners in the hierarchy with no opportunity for employee share owner-
ship. (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Turnover of partners is mostly initiated by the company. “If the partnership doesn’t 
work, we do not accept bad partners. We want the workload to be handled evenly by 
all, so the losers must go.” Sometimes this is due to unsuitability with the staff, for ex-
ample if a manager misuses their power, isn’t fair or just, or doesn’t get along with the 
staff for other reasons. It can also be because the partner doesn’t suit the management 
team. Other times turnover is of the unavoidable type: partners retire, become entre-
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preneurs, or move due to family reasons. It is surprising that most of the turnover of 
partners is not due to them leaving voluntarily. Voluntary turnover that happens is due 
to the evening and weekend focused nature of the work, and family reasons. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
All interviewees agreed that partnership has no effect on changing employers, even 
though partners are more committed. “Turnover among partners is moderately low” 
(A). Employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio group may not be the ultimate 
goal for the partners, either. “Staying 3-5 years in the Ravintolakolmio group is a realis-
tic estimate, for personal career development. But with our quite long termination pe-
riod, there’s no need to quickly change employers.” (A).  
 
Heimo Keskinen states that there are constantly people who are waiting for a partner-
ship place to open up in the company, from both within and without (Keskinen, H. 11 
September 2013). The interviewees didn’t agree with this. “I’ve never heard anyone say 
‘Oh I wish I’ll become a partner too’. No-one has announced they’re in line for the 
job.” (A). “Other employees see partnership as a burden and commitment” (C). 
 
The interviewees contemplated the reasons why some partners left the program. “One 
former partner was a contrarian, who always wanted to disagree. Another former part-
ner felt they were a great and powerful partner, only interested in the title instead of 
the job. I think that the reason behind many of the changes in partners is due to them 
being the wrong persons who didn’t get along with each other, or whose personalities 
didn’t fit the corporate values.” (B). “I don’t know if those who quit left because of 
partnership, but there was a lot to improve with the professionalism of the company at 
the time. Either way, those partners who were fired didn’t fail as managers because 
they were partners but due to other factors.” (A). A former partner stated that, “Leav-
ing partnership wasn’t a big deal” (C). 
 
4.5 Absenteeism 
Absenteeism takes one of two forms: the long-term absentee and the frequent offend-
er. The long-term absentee is someone who is away from work for a long time, often 
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unplanned and the result of a non-work-related injury or illness. It is not correlated 
with the employee’s ability or attitude. Frequent absenteeism is planned and deliberate, 
and often sudden, forcing managers to quickly find a replacement. Absenteeism is al-
ways negative and unproductive for companies, and long-term absence is the more 
costly of the two. Especially frequent absenteeism is heavily affected by job dissatisfac-
tion. (Levin & Kleiner 1992, 6-7.) 
 
Absenteeism is commonly measured in one or both of two ways: the time-lost index 
and the frequency index. In the time-lost index, the total duration of absence during a 
period of time is measured. In the frequency index, the total number of incidents of 
absence during a period of time is measured. Each index tells its own story of an em-
ployee’s sick leave(s), and when used in conjunction they can be a good tool for keep-
ing track of absenteeism. (Warr & Yearta 1995.) 
 
Heimo Keskinen states that “frequent absences are due to poor management. Often 
those establishments that have lots of sick days need the management to be given a 
little chat with. Absenteeism and employee turnover is almost always due to bad lead-
ership.” On the other hand, employees who have too much work for too long periods 
of time are prone to illness which can increase absenteeism or cause people to work 
when ill, which lowers productivity (Viitala 2009, 213). (Keskinen, H. 11 September 
2013.) 
 
Officially, on average in Finland, each employee takes between 5-15 sick days annually, 
costing their employer 1500€ (Työterveyslaitos 2012). The Confederation of Finnish 
Industries found in 2005 that workers in their member companies take on average 11 
sick days per year, with the cost averaging 1300€ per employee. The amount of sick 
days taken is lowest in the service industry, averaging only 4.3% annually. If the aver-
age amount of working days per year is 242 (Verohallinto 2013b), this equals to just 
under 10½ days. (Viitala 2009, 214.) 
 
Absenteeism is not measured at the Ravintolakolmio group by staff groups. The target 
level for the whole company is 3.5% of hours worked. The Ravintolakolmio group do 
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not separately keep track of whether absences are frequent or long-term, though the 
information is in their data. Most often, their absences are caused by accidents. Even 
though 3.5% is quite a tough goal, the cumulative 12 month level at the moment is 
3.3%. Calculated with the above average figures, in days, the Ravintolakolmio group’s 
3.5% equals just less than 8½ days. “Each one per cent of absenteeism equals to 
100 000€ of pure cash saved, and over the years we’ve dropped it down from 5.7%, 
saving us a total of 200 000€.” (Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Keskinen has the feeling that partners are much more committed, and thus are less 
absent. On the other hand, partners have a variety of different rewards, for example 
holidays, where they are abroad with full pay, upkeep and any other expenses such as 
training, covered by the company, which is not calculated as absenteeism, yet is not 
creating revenue directly. He also feels that, because partners work longer days, they 
are entitled to more time off, meaning that the figures of absenteeism can be skewed. 
(Keskinen, H. 11 September 2013.) 
 
Employee share ownership has affected absenteeism positively for some. “The flu 
doesn’t keep me from work, nor do I cancel prearranged things.” (B). Yet again 
though, all interviewees agreed to a degree that any low level of absenteeism is due to 
their personality, not ownership per se. “It hasn’t changed my absenteeism; I was never 
absent before, either” (A). “It had no effect on my absences” (C). “Partnership didn’t 
make me more conscientious” (B).  
 
The interviewees explained the practical effects that employee share ownership had on 
their timetables. “I feel that as a partner I must be reachable more, but no-one ques-
tions my comings and goings” (A). Another disagreed with the implication. “In princi-
pal it didn’t give me more flexibility and freedom with my holidays” (B).  
 
Not all appreciated the reward holidays either, as one interviewee explained. “These 
reward trips are not worth anything to me, as they have nothing to do with job satisfac-
tion. The things that help you 250 days a year are more important and should be fo-
cused on, instead of these vacations.” (A). 
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The flexibility that partnership may bring can be down to good planning. “I can and 
should organise my work so that there are periods of two to three months when I 
work more, and others periods of two to three months when I work less” (A). “With 
my promotion, I did gain the opportunity to plan my life a little more, but it wasn’t due 
to partnership, per se. When you plan the shifts yourself, you get to choose fitting ones 
for yourself. On the other hand, I am the flexible one in making service efficient; if it’s 
quiet, I can leave and the waiters don’t need to lose pay or hours, and on the other 
side, I’m also the one who often substitutes others.” (B). 
 
4.6 Performance Management 
While terms like productivity and profitability are used to describe the goals of a com-
pany as a whole, the analogy used in an individual employee’s case is performance. Per-
formance management is used to steer, measure and oversee employee performance. 
Performance measurement is an important toolset that can be used to assess the be-
haviour of employees in an organisation. It is useful for feedback on how in line with 
corporate strategies the employees are, and how their behaviour could be developed. 
The fulfilment of individual goals is a prerequisite for reaching organisational strategic 
goals (Phillips & Connell 2003, 195). It offers a chance at seeing current and potential 
managers’ skills too. Performance measurements are needed for a functioning reward 
system. (Viitala 2009, 132; Greer 2001, 225-226.) 
 
Performance management is not only important for setting and reaching goals within 
the company, but because studies show that job performance affects voluntary em-
ployee turnover. This can happen in many ways; poorly performing employees may 
leave to avoid poor reviews, employees may be shocked by received poor reviews, 
well-performing employees may feel undervalued or not reviewed at all, or employees 
may be insecure due to a total unawareness of their level of competence. The most 
important part of performance management is the communication between employer 
and employee, giving each other a realistic view of the other’s expectations and per-
formances. (Phillips & Connell 2003, 195-196.) 
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There are many different types of performance measurement systems available to 
companies, of which the most common ones are management by objectives, graphic 
rating scales, narratives and 360-degree feedback. Management by objectives is a sys-
tem where a subordinate sets objectives for the next time period, determines the 
measures by which it will be evaluated, and outlines an action plan to achieve these 
goals. Graphic rating scales use a scale of numerical values with short descriptions, for 
example 1-low quality to 7-high quality or 1-least productive to 7-most productive, 
similar to a Likert scale. Narratives are written descriptions of an employee’s perfor-
mance. In 360-degree feedback, employees are not only evaluated by their superiors, 
but also by their subordinates, peers and even customers. Performance measurement 
can also be done via a mix of different systems. (Greer 2001, 226-229.) 
 
In the Ravintolakolmio group, performance of managers is evaluated by subordinates 
and the managers themselves. The evaluation is done on multiple factors, and the aver-
ages of each topic are calculated finally. The topics are operational environment and 
leadership, business-mindedness, group leadership, individual leadership, competence 
and training, self-leadership, decision-making and responsibility, communication skills, 
leadership and situation management, and time management (Ostela-Pyhälä, E. 6 June 
2013). Based on these results, each manager is given a personal management develop-
ment programme. The average of performance management results in the last five 
years has been 4.04 on a scale of 1-5. (Ravintolakolmio-Ryhmä 2013b.) 
 
The management index is tracked for key personnel and partner owners separately, 
with slightly different questions and criteria. The average score for partners in 2013 
was 4.05 while for key personnel 3.91. The index, which offers insight into subordi-
nates’ experiences, is used as a tool to determine the suitability of partners, and has 
even been used as a basis for termination. Keskinen also notes that over time the eval-
uators, i.e. employees, become more critical toward their superiors. (Keskinen, H. 11 
September 2013.) 
 
Employee share ownership didn’t affect management performance much for the ma-
jority of partners. “I don’t think partnership has affected my work. I believe I lead the 
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same way as before partnership.” (A). “Partnership had no effect on my performance. 
My performance was exactly the same” (C). Some felt that it has affected their perfor-
mance too. “Maybe I’ve become a little stauncher. I don’t stress over pointless stuff, 
and try to keep both my feet on the ground and make strong decisions.” (B). An inter-
viewee explained the dynamic succinctly, “Since the job is to lead, if you want to do 
your job well, it is more affected by other factors than money. If you slap a thousand 
euros in my hand, I won’t lead any better than without it.” (A). 
 
Most believed that the changes that employee share ownership can cause within a per-
son can have positive effects concerning performance. “You can affect efficiency 
through your own behaviour” (B). “Partnership has maybe forced me to think about 
the holistic financial situation of the company, instead of just staring at the income 
statement, but also the other side – the balance sheet and the finances. It has improved 
my leadership by giving more holistic responsibility.” (A). Partners’ performance is in 
many ways an important issue in their opinion, which is connected to the issue of the 
perceived hierarchical bump for owners. “It’s important to be calming everyone down 
on busy nights. You can show through your own example that there’s no need to 
stress.” (B). Though it seems that this is no different from traditional leadership. 
 
One of the interviewees felt that there is a lot of significance to the management index 
results. “There are differences between partners and non-partners, and there should be. 
Partners should always have the best results.” (A). Another interviewee felt that per-
formance management results can vicariously affect others too. “Partnership can affect 
shift managers, who need more attention to their support and encouragement” (B). 
The management index measurements may not necessarily work as intended. “Some 
people answer them randomly; others take out their anger and frustration with their 
superiors in the surveys. They content of the surveys is not necessarily understood or 
the questions thought about.” (B).  
 
A genuine concern of one interviewee concerning the performance measurement was 
aimed at the meaningful growth of partners, instead of just the presentation of better 
results. “More should be done about partners’ personal development. It should be 
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genuinely focused on, and it would have a much more meaningful effect than a couple 
per cent of ownership. It would greatly improve the partners’ performance. We need to 
use resources for the actual holistic improvement of our partners in the same way that 
we want to focus on our employees’ wellbeing and development, and it is not getting 
the attention it needs right now. Career training within the company would be great: 
where people want to be in 5 years and helping them get there – that would be what 
would draw applicants in to partnership.” (A).  
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5 Conclusions 
Employee share ownership is an important part of the Ravintolakolmio group’s identi-
ty. It can be quite important for partner owners themselves; as compared to their peers 
in similar positions without ownership, they feel that they have lots of professional 
differences. From this, it can be deduced that employee share ownership has an intrin-
sic effect, as per Klein’s (1987) original model. Unfortunately, though, there is very 
little discourse about employee share ownership within the company.  
 
Most partner owners have no clear motives for becoming employee share owners, due 
to the almost compulsory nature of the system within the company. Employee share 
ownership seems to merely be part of the job description and while none of the part-
ners were pressured into it, none of them specifically aimed for it, either. This is re-
flected in a lack of personal goals. The objective of all partners is to make their respec-
tive companies more profitable; showing that one of the advantages of employee share 
ownership is the internalisation of company objectives as personal goals. 
 
The company gains, from employee share ownership, access to employee ideas for im-
provement and increased innovation capabilities, and the possibility for small admin-
istration due to the independent nature of partners. It also increases the visibility of 
owners in the establishment. Employee share ownership also motivates employees to 
minimise costs, and keep track of the competition. 
 
The drawbacks of employee share ownership for the company can be defined as being 
accountable to its employees and being under greater scrutiny by them, having to pro-
vide financial information, and the time and cost of implementing and using an em-
ployee share ownership program. Giving employees lots of power and freedom in de-
cision-making can result in the possibility that they can make dire mistakes. 
 
One of the common potential drawbacks of employee share ownership for companies 
is having to consider minority shareholder rights and opinions. In the Ravintolakolmio 
group’s case, though, this is mitigated due to two factors, harsh conditions and the low 
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level of signatories’ understanding. The conditions of the contract are harsh, yet not 
perceived as such by the partners, and are not discussed or negotiated beforehand with 
the signatories. The partners have not familiarised themselves with the contract, and do 
not necessarily even understand the contents, but merely trust their employer has good 
intentions, nor do they perceive any inequality between shareholders. 
 
Employee share ownership offers the partner owners of the Ravintolakolmio group 
the opportunity to access company information and participate in management and 
decision-making. They gain authority, respect, greater job scrutiny, independence and a 
hierarchical, symbolic promotion. Though, whether this stems from partnership or 
position is unclear. Yet, the results seem to indicate they are, at least, not completely 
separate, since the dynamics of employee share ownership are different from tradition-
al hierarchies. The partners also get sparring help from their peers, and have a commu-
nity of likeminded people. These can be defined as the instrumental effects of employ-
ee share ownership. 
 
The drawbacks of employee share ownership for the partners include the possibility of 
not having any real impact on the business and only having nominal power, yet having 
much more work. Though, even they gain no true power, employee share ownership 
shortens the power distance between the parties, and offers some opportunities. Since 
the amount of shares directly correlates with power naturally, partners infer their pow-
er from uniting and making decisions together. In the end, Heimo Keskinen’s authori-
ty, majority rule, and ultimate decision-making, is respected. Whether partnership truly 
affects responsibilities or powers is unclear from the results. 
 
Partner quality is valued over quantity, and share amounts are kept to a manageable 
size. The appropriate number of partner owners is the current amount, 21, or less. It 
should correlate with the size of the establishment, as well, so that small establishments 
should have less partners, while large ones more. 
 
The executive team has general jurisdiction, while the board functions as a mere “rub-
ber stamp”. Heimo Keskinen is at the top of the chain and has the right to veto any 
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decision. Being part of the executive team gives partners new responsibilities and tasks, 
but the executive team only handles certain manageable issues, and do not review im-
portant, discussion-worthy topics. There is a lot of room for improvement with the 
executive team, as many decisions are made elsewhere in actuality. The board of direc-
tors is mostly insignificant, and only handles standard legal issues, yet does possess the 
same potential power that Heimo Keskinen personally has. Being on the board does 
add at least to a CEO’s authority, which shows that some intrinsic value is therein. 
 
The holding company, Restasijoitus, is made up of CEOs and other especially talented 
partners, who possess the capability for multitasking, who all make up a strategic exec-
utive team. The aim of this is to utilise the competences of these individuals through-
out the whole company. In the strategic executive team, they gain further responsibili-
ties, powers and tasks, and it rewards through share value increase. The objective is 
that the strategic executive team handles issues with a scope of 7-12 months, the exec-
utive team is a reporting forum for issues in the next 3-6 months, and the local unit 
management handles the upcoming 1-3 months, while the Keskinen family make lead-
ing strategic decisions in the background.  
 
According to the results, the strategic executive team is too far removed from the day-
to-day, and the two-level system of decision-making is overly complicated. The strate-
gic executive team has problems making it inefficient, such as too many partners and 
not enough real power. Restavuokraus is Heimo Keskinen’s own holding company 
that conducts share trade exclusively as decided by the aforementioned. Questions 
were raised as to whether contracts and other issues could be handled instead by Res-
tasijoitus as a solution to some of its problems. 
 
Monetary rewards are one of the main incentives for partners. The employees get the 
opportunity to share in company profits and increase their own personal wealth. This 
can be a big incentive as the wages in the company are not necessarily competitive. At 
the moment though, job security is an even more important factor than monetary re-
wards. Concerning the amount of ownership, partners consistently want more percent-
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age of ownership, at least because currently the gains are not matched with the respon-
sibility and the work. These are the extrinsic factors in Klein’s (1987) model. 
 
One of the drawbacks for employees is the possible loss of their investment, and not 
being able to buy or sell shares. Heimo Keskinen states that no-one has lost money in 
the transactions, though that may not necessarily be true as the research showed oth-
erwise. Another drawback is not earning any dividends, as dividends are tied to a profit 
requirement outlined in a separate agreement. The goal for minimum paid dividends is 
set at the amount needed for interest and amortisation annually, and if the company 
has no profit to pay dividends, this can be loaned from Heimo Keskinen. The esti-
mates given for dividends and pay-outs are small and do not correspond with the 
guidelines.  
 
Heimo Keskinen is not scared that he will lose his investment or share value as a con-
sequence of the employee share ownership program, but instead feels that it has in-
creased the value of his company. This argument is supported as partners themselves 
hope to increase the company’s value and finances through their participation in the 
program. Employee share ownership also reduces employee wage demands and pro-
vides a source of investment for the company. 
 
Employee share ownership offers income for partners that is more tax beneficial than 
earned income. Capital income is essentially always better than earned income tax-wise. 
In Finland, the best situation tax-wise, aka the lowest tax percentage, for shareholders 
of private limited companies is for those with large net asset value and relatively low 
dividends per share. Highest taxes will be paid by those with stock in companies with 
small net asset values and high dividends per share, for example very few owners in 
small companies with small net asset values and large profits. Dividends are always 
calculated according to all shares and not merely those receiving the dividends. In the 
Ravintolakolmio group, an example situation with one of their companies would 
equate to an average of 1700€ per partner per year for the most tax efficient income. 
For the 4000€ guideline figure, the tax rate would by 18%. Income taxation is not the 
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company’s concern though, but unfortunately, none of the partners knew much about 
it, which should be fixed. 
 
Employee share ownership increases the motivation of the participants, making them 
braver and more innovative. Motivation is increased due to its beneficial and tangible 
value. Even though those selected into the program are generally entrepreneurial and 
responsible by nature, they get to grow as business people. At best, partnership in-
creases work output, while at worst, it merely leaves it at the same level as before. 
 
Ownership can also be an emotional burden that can make the good better and the bad 
worse. It can make partners vain and arrogant, and be detrimental to the job environ-
ment. It requires more work and responsibility, in exchange for the increased freedom 
and power it brings. This means that employee share ownership may frighten some 
potential or current partners. 
 
The aim of employee share ownership is to increase commitment due to the expensive 
and time-consuming nature of recruitment. Employee share ownership works as in-
tended as it increases employee loyalty and commitment, which are the biggest ad-
vantages for the company, as acknowledged by all parties. Partners felt leaving is more 
difficult and that they are more bound to and responsible for the operations.  
 
Statistically, employee share ownership increases job satisfaction among participants, as 
their satisfaction scores are higher, at 3.99/5. Yet, partners interviewed could not de-
finitively say if they are more satisfied. Employee share ownership has the possibility to 
either improve or decrease job satisfaction, meaning that the empirical results are un-
clear. All partners would recommend partnership, to a degree. 
 
The statistics indicate a lower turnover among partners than other staff, with employee 
turnover percentage being 28.5% and 5%, respectively. Most partner turnover is insti-
gated by the company, though sometimes it is due to personal reasons also. Even 
though partners are more committed, employee share ownership does not have any 
direct effect on changing employers. This is because changing employers is due to rea-
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sons not affected by partnership, such as getting fired or changing jobs due to mistakes 
made or being unsuitable for the company. Employee share ownership does not thus 
offer insurance against firing or abnormally long careers. Management feel that there 
are people constantly in line for partnership positions, though the interviewees indicat-
ed that this is not the case. 
 
Partners should in general be absent less due to their higher level of commitment, and 
this assumption is fulfilled. Partners work more and feel that they are absent less, 
though whether this is due to personal attitudes or partnership itself is unclear. Part-
ners have more opportunities for holidays than most, at least in part to being in charge 
of planning, offering them higher flexibility with their timetables. 
 
Partner owners perform better than other employees, as indicated by correlation in the 
Ravintolakolmio group’s management index. The score for partners is 4.04/5 while for 
others it is 3.91/5. Partners themselves did not feel that partnership itself affected their 
work performance, but instead that perhaps they are partners because of higher per-
formance. Money does not increase their leadership skills, but having a more strategic 
mind-set concerning goals and finances increases their efficacy. Partners may also have 
a vicarious effect on the performances of their subordinates. The personal manage-
ment development programme is an important factor in increasing performance, yet is 
not focused on enough in the company. 
 
5.1 Implications 
In conclusion, employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio Group offers the 
following benefits for employees: access to company information, a sense of owner-
ship, authority, a community of peers, increased competitive awareness, increased 
commitment, increased motivation, and increased identification with the company. In 
addition, employee share ownership offers tax-efficient rewards, even though this has 
not been actualised in the company, due to the minimal rewarding so far; and addition-
al rights such as decision-making, though ultimately quite minimally. Employee share 
ownership does not guarantee a longer career. The results on whether partner owner-
ship increased job satisfaction are unclear. 
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The drawbacks of employee share ownership are the possibility of not earning any div-
idends, possibly due to not reaching sufficient profit requirements. Another drawback 
is not being able to buy shares; though fortunately selling shares is always possible. The 
possibility for losing one’s investment is always present, though mitigated by Heimo 
Keskinen’s actions of covering losses. Whether or not partners have any true impact 
on the business is unclear. 
 
Benefits for the company are access to employee innovation capabilities, higher visibil-
ity of ownership, a source of investment capital, motivating employees to cost minimi-
sation, reduced employee turnover, reduced wage demands, a smaller administration, 
and improved employee performance. It is unclear whether employee share ownership 
causes reduced absenteeism or reduced employee-management conflicts. 
 
The main drawback for the company is the possibility that employees with more power 
make bigger mistakes. The company also has to provide financial information to em-
ployees, though they do not mind this as they are proud of their finances. They are also 
under greater employee scrutiny and accountable to employees, though this is minimal 
due to how employee share ownership does not alter the dynamic drastically enough to 
affect this – Heimo Keskinen is still in charge of these minority owners. The company 
also has to consider minority shareholder rights and opinions, yet this is mitigated due 
to the harsh contractual conditions and low level of understanding of the signatories. 
One disproven drawback is the possibility that the company loses share value or in-
vestment, as employee share ownership has significantly grown the net value of the 
company, benefitting all. 
 
Pertaining to the perceptions of employee share ownership, it is a crucial part of the 
Ravintolakolmio group’s identity as an employer, and it is fairly compulsory to those in 
positions liable to partnership. Partner ownership is highly valued by the participatory 
employees also, as they see that they are miles apart from peers working in similar posi-
tions with no ownership. Unfortunately, though, the partner owners have little to no 
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clear motives for ownership, which correlates with its compulsory nature, and adopt 
corporate objectives as their own. 
 
The hypothesis was that employee share ownership is beneficial by increasing com-
mitment in employees due to rewards, which in turn increase due to better perfor-
mance. The research correlates with this hypothesis. It is significant to note how re-
wards are perceived by the recipient, as the same level of reward can be perceived in 
different ways, leading to opposite viewpoints concerning employee share ownership. 
 
Based on my results, I feel that employee share ownership’s benefits outweigh its 
drawbacks, and that most drawbacks, especially for the company, are mitigated by their 
actions and preparations. The dynamic of ownership is appropriate, and while the 
partners may feel that they want more shares and power, they may not necessarily be 
ready or competent for it. Giving employees enough ownership to acquire the im-
proved results and benefits, yet not too much to lose ultimate power or leave room for 
big mistakes, is the correct approach from the commissioning company’s perspective. 
It is possible also that more ownership increases results positively, and from the em-
ployees’ perspective, this is an avenue that should be investigated.   
 
All in all, it is hard to determine whether employee share ownership truly has a perma-
nent or even temporary effect on the dynamic, employees and company, or if they are 
caused by good management. Correlation does not necessarily equate causation. 
 
5.2 Process & Timetable 
This thesis provides a neutral, outside view into the Ravintolakolmio group, and offers 
them meaningful insight as interviewees were able to speak freely. The information is 
applicable and valid only in Finland and only for the Ravintolakolmio group. As most 
statistics and other factors are comparative by nature and merely measured by the 
commissioning party, and were not reinforced by additional measures during this the-
sis, there are accuracy issues herein that must be taken into account when reviewing 
the results. The data is applicable to the hospitality industry to a certain degree.  
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During the thesis writing process, there were certain changes that took place that were 
not addressed in this paper. The taxation principles to be adopted in 2014 were re-
vised, and are still merely guidelines that are subject to alteration. In the newest guide-
lines, at the time of publishing, any dividends over 8% of net asset value per share are 
75% taxable as earned income, instead of capital income (Veronmaksajat 2013). The 
website of the Ravintolakolmio group was renewed. The thesis was written with this 
information in the form that it was at the time of writing. 
 
The timetable of this thesis was lengthened, as the subject matter’s scope grew to en-
compass more than originally planned, while simultaneously work and other commit-
ments reduced viable thesis-writing time. I learned a great deal about the strategic hu-
man resources management of a large, private restaurant company, as I had intended. 
 
As to the thesis process itself, the main issues that could’ve been improved upon were 
the data collection process and the writing of the thesis. Interviews were a viable track 
to pursue when collecting the data, yet questionnaires or other quantitative methods 
could’ve provided more accurate information. Writing in the “zipper”-model would’ve 
been easier if all the data had been collected beforehand, but on the other hand, I was 
intimidated to conduct the interviews before I felt I was absolutely “prepared”, draw-
ing out the process. Klein’s (1987 in McCarthy et al 2010) model would’ve been a use-
ful basis for the theoretical background and the outline of the thesis, had I been famil-
iar with it beforehand. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
There is little reliable, quantitative data to support the claims of employee share owner-
ship working in the way that my research has outlined. There are lots of problems with 
studying the issue. With the theoretical background, the problem is that most studies 
published are from the US, and are about public companies that have applied pro-
grams to all their employees.  
 
In my own research, due to the limited scope, there was no comparison to other com-
panies or other situations, and only the perceptions of mid- to upper-level managers 
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were researched. The research, along with the supporting data, only pertains to the cur-
rent situation of the Ravintolakolmio group specifically, and does not look at for ex-
ample non-participatory parties in the context of employee share ownership. 
 
As to the interviews, there are many issues that must be taken into account. The partic-
ipants may or may not truly know enough about the subject to answer questions accu-
rately, or they may not have any base for comparison. Each individual, each restaurant 
and each situation is different, so that comparing subjective experiences can be diffi-
cult. The sample could be unbalanced and provide a biased result, too positive or too 
negative. Their answers could be affected by social constructs, and the interviewer may 
unintentionally have an effect on their answers or the subjective interpretation and 
analysis of their answers. Interview questions can be self-serving or leading (Hirsjärvi 
& Hurme 2011, 35). 
 
The sample size of this study could be too small meaning that generalisations cannot 
be made, though I believe they gave enough valuable information to mitigate this risk 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme 2011, 58-59). A too large sample is not an issue with this research, 
though. The qualitative data was not quantified during the thesis process, as the sample 
was small enough to be manageable without quantification (Brotherton 2008, 208). 
 
The reliability of the research is diminished slightly by the fact that one interviewee did 
not respond at all, and that since all answers are subjective, the same interviewees 
could have different answers on a different day – a typical pitfall of qualitative research. 
Objective reality is the goal in this and all research, though, and the issue should be 
researched again in a similar or differing manner later to definitively prove the reliabil-
ity. To prove a high validity, the results of this research should be able to be used to 
forecast future results; which again would require another study. The validity of this 
study is proven in part, though, by the correlation with the theoretical background. If 
another study was to be conducted, regression toward the mean could be taken into 
account in the results, to even out if the results of this study are biased. (Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme 2011, 185-190.) 
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As to the information provided by the Ravintolakolmio group, it is only as reliable as 
the trust placed in the commissioning party, and the way it is measured. In this thesis, 
the word of the commissioning company was taken as such, with no need for ques-
tions concerning reliability. It should be said, though, that the indexes and factors that 
the Ravintolakolmio group measure may not necessarily have any control groups and 
thus may be meaningless, apart for the fluctuations of the scores over time. Even these 
fluctuations, though, which can be considered valid, can have vastly different explana-
tions. 
 
This thesis did not study whether employee share ownership increases the profitability 
or productivity of the company, whether employees have increased work participation, 
or weigh the time and cost of implementing and maintaining the employee share own-
ership system against its benefits, which can be crucial in determining its net value. 
 
One issue directly connected to employee share ownership in the Ravintolakolmio 
group was not taken into account during this thesis. It does not discuss the effects, or 
differences, of senior partnership nor specifically study the rewards therein, due to its 
limited scope. No senior partners were interviewed, and any effects additional reward 
or commitment plans may have on perceptions of partners are bundled into the effects 
employee share ownership in general has. 
 
5.4 Recommendations 
Additional research of the subject; both pertaining to within the Ravintolakolmio 
group, and to the employee share ownership subject in general; is required. For the 
Ravintolakolmio group, a quantitative survey of all partner owners could help resolve 
some issues unsolved in this research, and verify the rest. Interviews with a larger sam-
ple could verify the reliability and validity of this research. A comparative study con-
cerning the time before partner ownership in the company could show how it has al-
tered the dynamic, while a comparative study to others in the field could show the true 
benefits and drawbacks. 
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There are many issues that could be studied, stemming from this subject. This thesis 
does not study whether employee share ownership increases equality and social justice, 
employee participation or sense of ownership. This thesis does not discuss whether 
employee share ownership could be beneficial when applied to the whole workforce 
and whether the effects enhanced when used with key employees. Whether employee 
share ownership increases the economic growth, profitability and productivity of the 
company; whether rewarding employees thusly has a permanent or temporary effect, 
and are the effects stable over time; and whether these correlations between employee 
share ownership and “its” benefits can truly be attributed to the program and not 
merely a company’s affinity for rewarding or good management; are all topics that 
should be studied further.  
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